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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first two essays study the association 
between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. There is an emerging 
debate about whether firms tradeoff between tax savings and reported earnings. Essay 1 
examines this relationship in the Canadian context and finds that tax aggressiveness is 
negatively associated with financial reporting aggressiveness, suggesting the existence of 
a tradeoff. However, closely-held firms seem to be making no tradeoffs between tax 
savings and book income. This essay also finds that closely-held firms are more 
aggressive in pursuing tax savings compared to other firms. 
Essay 2 examines the tradeoff question in the North American context. I find that tax 
reporting aggressiveness is positively associated with financial reporting aggressiveness 
for U.S. firms (i.e., U.S. firms in general do not seem to tradeoff between the tax savings 
and book income), while negatively associated for Canadian firms (i.e., Canadian firms 
do seem to tradeoffbetween pursuit of tax savings and book income). Within the U.S. 
sub-sample, there is no difference in tradeoff behavior between closely-held and 
widely-held firms. Closely-held firms in Canada do not seem to tradeoff between book 
income and tax savings, thereby pursuing both tax aggressiveness and financial reporting 
aggressiveness simultaneously. 
Essay 3 focuses on financial reporting and examines the association between IFRS 
11 
adoption and executive compensation. More specifically, I examine whether IFRS better 
reflects firms' and managers' performance. I find that accounting-based pay for 
performance sensitivity is stronger in the year of IFRS adoption. My results show that 
CF Os earned approximately $108,000 more in the year of IFRS adoption. In contrast, the 
chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation did not change significantly in the year of 
IFRS adoption. I also find CF Os' bonus relative to CEO bonus increased by more than 20% 
in the year of IFRS adoption. 
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ESSAYl 
Tax Aggressiveness and Closely-held 
Firms: Evidence from Canada 
1. Introduction 
The gap between book income and taxable income has been increasing over recent 
years (e.g., Hanlon and Shevlin 2005, Desai 2003). This has given rise to an emerging 
debate about the causes driving this growing gap. Earlier literature suggested that firms 
were forced to make tradeoffs between tax savings and reported income (e.g., Klassen 
1997; Beatty and Harris 1999; Klassen and Mawani 2000; Mawani 2003; Shackelford 
and Shevlin 2001). Therefore, the larger book-tax gap could be driven by either increased 
book income or decreased taxable income, or both. More recent literature (e.g., Frank et 
al. 2009) suggests that firms can and do pursue both tax reporting aggressiveness and 
financial reporting aggressiveness simultaneously, thereby implying that firms may not 
need to choose between doing only one of tax reporting aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness. This finding implies the increasing gap in book and taxable 
income could be driven by increased book income and decreased taxable income 
simultaneous! y. 
Tax aggressiveness is defined in the literature as the "downward management of 
taxable income through tax planning activities that may or may not be considered 
fraudulent tax reporting" (Frank et al. 2009). Financial reporting aggressiveness is 
defined as "upward earnings management that may or may not be within the confines of 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)" (Frank et al. 2009). 
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The inconclusive empirical evidence in the literature leads me to examine the reasons 
for these conflicting results. One possible explanation is that there are some types of 
firms that may engage more or less in this dual aggressive behaviour. More specifically, 
it is conceivable that some firms are trading off between the two goods (book income and 
tax savings) while others are not trading off as much, and able to pursuing both goods 
simultaneously. 
Both tax and earnings management literatures suggest concentrated ownership is an 
important factor that can influence the tax savings and earnings management behavior 
(e.g., Klassen 1997; Leuz et al. 2003; Ding et al. 2007; Kim and Yi 2006). Closely-held 
firms may face different financial reporting and tax reporting pressures, and it is possible 
they behave differently from widely-held firms. My study examines three research 
questions. First, I examine whether firms trade-off between tax reporting aggressiveness 
and financial reporting aggressiveness in a Canadian setting. Second, I examine whether 
closely-held firms tradeoff differently between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness. Finally, I examine whether closely-held firms are more or less 
aggressive in pursuing tax savings. 
I find that the tradeoff between book income and tax savings in general seems to hold 
across countries, across sample periods and across variations in the specifications of the 
dependent and independent variables. This study contributes to the tradeoff literature by 
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finding that some types of firms do behave differently on the tradeoff decision, thereby 
explaining some of the conflicting empirical findings in the literature. 
This study also contributes to the tax aggressiveness literature by introducing a new 
proxy for tax aggressiveness. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) suggest that tax research 
should consider "all parties, all taxes, and all costs." This study emphasizes "all costs" by 
examining whether firms minimize the sum of taxes paid plus any associated tax fees. 
Tax aggressive firms are likely to invest on tax planning fees efficiently and minimize the 
aggregate of the two payments. 
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine the tradeoff between 
tax and financial reporting aggressiveness in a non-U.S. context. Canadian firms may 
behave differently from U.S. firms for several reasons. First, Canadian firms tend to be 
more closely-owned with more concentrated ownership or more dual-class share 
structures (Ben-Amar and Andre 2006; Morck et al. 2000; Amoaku-Adu and Smith 2001; 
Smith and Amoaku-Adu 1999). Most of these studies argue that concentrated ownership 
is associated with less information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, thereby 
reducing the pressure to manage reported earnings. Firms facing lower financial 
reporting pressure could make different tradeoffs (i.e., pursue more tax savings) 
compared to firms under higher financial reporting pressure (i.e., put more weight on 
book income). Second, Canadian firms are likely to be less aggressive in their tax 
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reporting because of more stringent enforcement by Canadian tax authorities compared to 
U.S. tax authorities. A typical corporation based in Ontario faced a combined 
federal-provincial tax rate of26.5% in 2013 1 compared to 35% in the U.S.2 Despite the 
lower corporate tax rates in Canada, corporate taxes made up 1.9% of Canada's GDP in 
2012 compared to the higher U.S. corporate tax rates making up 1.6% of the U.S. GDP in 
2012.3 This difference may be explained by differences in GDP growth, differences in 
tax enforcement and differences in tax complexity that may make tax enforcement easier 
in Canada. 
Canadian and U.S. firms may also face different levels of financial reporting pressure 
due to differences between Canadian GAAP (and more recently IFRS) and U.S. GAAP, 
or differences in other financial reporting regulation (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley). Combined 
with different levels of tax enforcement, firms from different jurisdictions may make 
different choices regarding the book tax trade-off. The Canadian setting with its higher 
incidence of closely-owned firms also enables me to examine the impact of ownership 
concentration and voting rights on the trade-off decision. In Canada, dividends paid to 
corporate shareholders are entirely tax-free, allowing (family-owned) economic entities 
1 http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Tax _Rate_ Card_ -_ 2013 _ Corporate/$FILE/Tax-Rates-Corpo 
rate-2013. pdf 
2http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Worldwide_corporate_tax_guide_2012/$FILE/WCTG_2012 
_Worldwide_ Corporate_ Tax_ Guide.pdf 
3 http://www.cato.org/b log/ corporate-tax-low-rates-high-revenues 
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to have complex corporate structures without corresponding tax costs (other than some 
compliance costs). In contrast, U.S. family firms paying dividends to related corporate 
shareholders face some level of income tax. The different institutional environments 
between Canada and the U.S. offer an interesting setting to examine the association 
between ownership concentration and tradeoff decisions. 
I use two proxies for closely-held firms in this study. One proxy is equity ownership 
concentration measured by the extent of insider and family ownership. The second proxy 
is concentration of control as measured by the existence and extent of a dual class voting 
structure. 
Although family firms and insider firms are different to some extent, they can share 
similar attitudes towards tax savings. They both face lower financial reporting costs, and 
therefore can be expected to pursue more tax savings. I consider the aggregate of insider 
and family ownership because they are theoretically similar on the important dimension 
of information asymmetry, which is used to hypothesize such firms' need for engaging in 
financial and tax reporting aggressiveness. 
I investigate tax and financial reporting for the 300 largest firms trading on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX 300) for the period from 2005 to 2008, inclusive. I find 
that tax reporting aggressiveness is negatively associated with financial reporting 
aggressiveness in Canada. In decomposing my sample into closely-held and non-closely 
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held firms, I find that firms with higher insider and family ownership make different 
tradeoffs between the two goods (tax savings and book income) compared to firms with 
lower insider and family ownership combined. I also find that firms with higher insider 
and family ownership combined are more aggressive in their tax planning. Similar to 
findings of closely-held firms, firms with dual class share structures make different 
tradeoffs between the two goods compared to firms that are non-dual class. Furthermore, 
dual class firms are also more aggressive in their tax planning. On average, firms with 
higher insider and family ownership pay a statistically significant 44% less in total taxes 
and tax fees combined compared to firms that are not closely-held in the univariate test. 
Closely-held firms also pay $42 million less in total taxes and tax fees compared to firms 
that are not closely-held after controlling for other factors. Finally, the Cash Effective 
Tax Rate (Cash ETR) is 1.7 percentage points less on average for firms with higher 
insider and family ownership (15.2% vs. 16.9%)4• 
My results have important policy and practice implications. First, this study provides 
insights about financial accounting and tax reporting conformity over time. Second, taxes 
are material, with firms paying approximately 15% of their pretax income to 
governments in the form of taxes. They are therefore likely to engage in efforts to 
4 The mean (median) cash effective tax rate (Cash ETR) for firms with higher insider and family 
ownership is 15.2% (7.2%), while the mean (median) cash ETR for firms with lower insider and family is 
16.9% (12.5%). Cash ETR is the cash taxes paid divided by pretax income. 
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minimize such payments. Tax authorities could benefit from knowing which firms are 
more likely to be aggressive in tax planning, and thereby target their scarce auditing and 
monitoring resources more effectively and efficiently. Third, external auditors can also be 
more effective and efficient by knowing which firms are more likely to be aggressive in 
their financial reporting. Finally, investors should also be interested in understanding 
which firms are more likely to be aggressive in financial reporting. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Hypotheses are developed in 
section two after the discussion of literature. In section three, research design and data 
description are introduced. Section four presents the results from regression analyses and 
section five summarizes and concludes. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Trade-off between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness 
A somewhat independent set of rules for computing GAAP income and taxable 
income allows firms some opportunity to reduce tax costs, report higher income, or both. 
The book-tax divergence has been steadily growing over time, thereby attracting much 
research attention (e.g., Guenther et al. 1997; Mills and Newberry 2001; Hanlon et al. 
2005). The literature remains silent on whether the divergence is driven more by tax 
sheltering (tax aggressiveness) or more by earnings management (financial reporting 
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aggressiveness), or equally by both trends. 
Frank et al. (2009) develop a measure of tax aggressiveness that has been widely 
used in the literature. They find a positive and significant association between tax 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness, suggesting that firms may not be 
forced to trade-off between the pursuit of book income and tax savings. However, Frank 
et al. admit that "[ e ]ven if firms have the ability to be aggressive for both financial and 
tax reporting purposes, it is not obvious that firms would be willing to engage in both 
behaviors" (at pg. 4 71 ). 
Frank et al. 's finding is in contrast with the previous literature that suggests firms are 
unlikely to be able to minimize tax payments and maximize book income simultaneously 
due to some interdependence or similarity of rules for computing both. As a result, firms 
need to tradeoff tax savings and reporting higher book income. The separation of 
management and ownership creates information asymmetry, and managers use reported 
earnings as one means to resolve such asymmetry. Managers attempt to meet or exceed 
shareholders' expectation regarding earnings. Firms that face lower financial reporting 
costs are arguably able to pursue tax planning more aggressively compared to other firms. 
Klassen (1997), for example, shows that firms with large insider ownership - a proxy of 
lower financial reporting costs - report lower gains and/or higher loss. This constitutes 
evidence that closely-held firms may focus more on saving taxes rather than maximizing 
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reported earnings. At an extreme, Erickson et al. (2004) found managers engaged in 
fraudulent financial reporting paid an additional eight cents in taxes to report each 
additional dollar of fraudulent earnings, confirming a trade-off between reported income 
and taxable savings. Consistent with Erickson et al. (2004), Lennox et al. (2013) also find 
that U.S. public firms engaging in tax aggressiveness are less likely to be involved in 
accounting fraud. All of these studies provide empirical evidence that firms tradeoff 
between the two goods. In addition, firms are generally reluctant to pursue minimization 
of taxes payable and maximization of book income simultaneously. Mills (1998) reports 
that "Internal Revenue Service (IRS) proposed audit adjustments increase as the excess 
of book income over taxable income increases." Such penalties serve as a brake on 
aggressive tax planning. 
Due to the inconclusive evidence in literature, I do not predict the direction of the 
relation between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. I first 
establish whether Canadian firms tradeoff between the two goods or pursue both goods 
simultaneously with the following hypothesis (in alternate form): 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, tax aggressiveness is associated with financial 
reporting aggressiveness. 
2.2 Tradeoff decision and ownership concentration 
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2.2.1 Tax aggressiveness and ownership concentration 
Insider and /or family ownership reduces information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders, thereby potentially impacting financial reporting 
aggressiveness. Greater pursuit of financial reporting income, in tum, could lead to 
reduced emphasis on tax savings to the extent that the two are linked via similar 
computational rules. A survey by Cloyd et al. (1996) found that (widely held) public 
firms cared relatively more about financial reporting costs and less about taxes. The 
survey also found that managers of public firms are less likely to choose conformity 
between financial and tax reporting compared to managers of private firms, presumably 
because widely held public firms face higher levels of financial reporting costs. In other 
words, when forced to trade-off between financial reporting income and tax savings, 
large public firms (presumably more widely-held than private firms) tend to choose 
reporting higher financial income while smaller and private firms put more weight on the 
tax savings. Mills and Newberry (2001) confirm the findings of Cloyd et al. (1996) by 
documenting that "higher debt levels impose greater non-tax costs on firms that are 
privately held or more financially distressed." 
Similar to public or private ownership, insider and/or family ownership can also 
impact tax aggressiveness and/or financial reporting aggressiveness. For example, 
Wolfson (1993) provides evidence that the "financial reporting consequences of tax 
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planning strategies are relatively less important where business ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of relatively few investors". This finding is similar to Klassen 
(1997) who finds firms with larger inside ownership concentration take larger losses or 
smaller gains when they are highly taxable. These studies document that firms with high 
concentration of insider and family owners makes them more concerned about reducing 
their taxes. In contrast, Chen et al. (2010) find that firms owned or managed by founding 
family members are less tax aggressive compared to non-family firms. They explain their 
results by claiming that family firms forgo tax savings in order to report higher earnings 
and thereby avoid potential price discounts imposed by shareholders. According to Chen 
et al. (2010), these family firms have higher non-tax costs such as reputation costs and 
potential personal penalties for tax avoidance. Steijvers and Niskanen (2011) extend 
Chen et al. (2010) to private firms and find that private family firms are less tax 
aggressive than private non-family firms. However, the overall empirical evidence in this 
literature is not conclusive about whether insider/family firms are more tax aggressive. 
One possible reason for the difference in results could be that some studies examine only 
tax aggressiveness without controlling for financial reporting aggressiveness or financial 
reporting costs (e.g., Chen et al. 2010). 
2.2.2 Financial reporting aggressiveness and ownership concentration 
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It is not clear whether closely-held firms are more or less aggressive in their 
financial reporting. Insider and family owned firms are likely to face lower financial 
reporting costs since there is less information asymmetry between shareholders and 
managers. This could lead closely-held firms to be less aggressive in their financial 
reporting. Leuz et al. (2003) argue that shareholders of firms with high ownership 
concentration attempt to protect their private control benefits, and therefore are less likely 
to use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Furthermore, 
their incentives to mask firm performance by using earnings management are lower 
compared to widely-held firms. In other words, the financial reporting aggressiveness in 
closely-held firms is likely to be lower than in widely-held firms. 
On the other hand, insider and family owned firms may need to report higher book 
income to compensate the potential price discount imposed by outside shareholders (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2010). Ding et al. (2007) examine 273 privately-owned and state-owned 
Chinese listed companies and find the relation between earnings management and 
ownership concentration exhibits a statistically significant non-linear, inverted U-shape 
pattern known as the "entrenchment versus alignment" effect. 
Making tradeoffs implies firms want to purse two goods (book income and tax 
savings, in this case) but are forced to emphasize on only one (Klassen 1997). Making 
different tradeoffs includes making no tradeoffs (i.e., firms want to and are able to purse 
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two goods simultaneously). Making different tradeoffs may also include the possibility 
that firms are pursuing only one good (e.g., tax savings only), with no significant interest 
in pursuing the other good. While unlikely, making different tradeoffs does not preclude 
the possibility that firms are pursing neither goods. 
I predict that firms with higher insider and /or family ownership tradeoff differently 
between tax savings and reported earnings. Due to the conflicting results in literature 
about whether closely-held firms are more tax aggressive, I do not predict the sign of the 
association between tax aggressiveness and insider and /or family ownership. I aggregate 
insider and family ownership for my empirical tests to examine how the combined 
ownership affects firms' decisions to tradeoff between tax savings and reported earnings. 
My hypotheses (in alternate form) are as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus,.firms with higher insider/family ownership are likely 
to make different tradeoffs between tax aggressiveness and .financial reporting 
aggressiveness compared to firms with lower insider/family ownership. 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, firms with higher insider I family ownership are more 
or less tax aggressive compared to firms with lower insider I family ownership. 
2.3 Trade-off decision and ownership or control concentration 
2.3.1 Tax aggressiveness and ownership or control concentration 
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Canada has a fair number of firms with dual class shares. Dual class firms are firms 
with more than one class of voting shares. Dual class voting share structures impose 
agency costs for the firms. If the divergence between cash flow rights and management 
control rights increases, managers with concentrated ownership may seek to pursue more 
private benefits (Gompers et al. 2010). One way to pursue such private benefits involves 
being more aggressive in tax and/or financial reporting compared to firms without the 
dual class structure if the managers' own personal benefits from this behaviour exceeds 
the personal cost, regardless of the costs to the firm. Dual class firms are one kind of 
closely-held firms with concentrated control and/or ownership, and they may make 
different tradeoff decisions. 
Similar to insider and family-owned firms, dual class firms often face lower financial 
reporting costs. Controlling shareholders have greater inside information about the firm 
and therefore need to rely less on the GAAP income. Being freed from the pressures of 
earnings management, dual class firms could therefore be able to pursue tax savings 
more aggressively. However, there is a competing "quiet life" motivation that suggesting 
that controlling shareholders may want to enjoy a quiet life and avoid costly activities. In 
line with this theory, McGuire et al. (2011) find public dual class firms are less 
aggressive in tax savings than other public firms. 
In contrast to McGuire et al. (2011 ), Thuan and Xu (2011) provide evidence that 
15 
dual class structure enables managers to focus on long-term development of firms and 
ignore short-term earnings pressure. Thuan and Xu (2011) show that firms with dual 
class shares are less likely to manage their earnings. Pursuit of tax savings is not 
inconsistent with firms' pursuit of long-term development, and therefore, dual class firms 
are likely to be more tax aggressive. 
2.3 .2 Financial reporting aggressiveness and ownership or control concentration 
It is not conclusive whether dual class voting structured firms are going to be more or 
less aggressive in financial reporting. Kim and Yi (2006) studied Korean public and 
private firms, and they find that as the control-ownership disparity becomes larger (e.g., 
dual class voting structure), controlling shareholders tend to engage more in 
opportunistic earnings management. 
However, consistent with quiet life view, Zhao and Chen (2008) found that dual 
class firms are less aggressive in their financial reporting. Based on motivations of 
avoiding all risks, it is possible that dual class firms may also want to avoid tax 
aggressiveness simultaneously (McGuire et al. 2011 ). Therefore, such firms may tradeoff 
differently (i.e., they don't pursue either good) compared to other firms. 
I predict that firms with dual voting structure are likely to make different tradeoffs 
between tax savings and book income. My hypotheses (in alternate form) are as follows: 
16 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, dual class firms make different tradeoffs between tax 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness compared to non-dual class firms. 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, dual class firms are more or less tax aggressive 
compared to non-dual class firms. 
2.4 Total tax costs 
Cash taxes payable and book income have different cash flow consequences. 
Theoretically speaking, insider and family shareholders are more likely to direct their 
firms to minimize cash outflows instead of maximizing reported earnings when the latter 
do not necessarily represent cash inflows. As a result, firms with higher insider and 
family ownership are more likely to be aggressive in their tax planning. 
Measures of tax aggressiveness include book-tax differences (e.g., Mills 1996; 
Jimenez-Angueira 2007), adjusted book-tax differences, permanent book-tax differences 
(e.g., Chen et. al 2010), effective tax rates (e.g., Zimmerman 1983, Gupta and Newberry 
1997), adjusted effective tax rates such as cash effective tax rates (e.g., Dyreng et al. 
2008), uncertain tax benefits (e.g., Alexander et al. 2008) and the residual of regression 
models used by Frank et al. (2010).5 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) suggest that researchers should consider "all parties, 
5 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) offer an excellent review of this literature. 
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all taxes and all costs" based on Scholes et al. 's (2005) dictum. The reference to "all 
taxes" is a call to include implicit taxes where possible. While the literature has paid 
more attention to taxes paid to governments, the tax fees paid to consultants constitute a 
similar non-discretionary cash outflow for the firm. In the U.S., the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) requires (since 2000) public firms to disclose total fees 
paid to external auditors as well as (since 2003) tax fees paid to external auditors (Bedard 
et al. 2010). Similar disclosure of tax fees became mandatory in Canada and effective 
July 2004 (Rule 52-1 lOFl). 
One reason why tax fees to consultants have garnered more attention is that they can 
and do reduce tax burden significantly. Mills et al. ( 1998) find effective tax rates to be 
negatively associated with tax planning investment at both statistically and economically 
significant levels. They report that "[ o ]n average, an additional one dollar investment in 
tax planning results in a $4 reduction in tax liabilities" (Mills et al. 1998, page 1 ). In my 
computation of "all costs," I include the taxes paid to government as well as the fees paid 
to consultant for tax related services. 
I therefore assume that firms attempt to minimize the aggregate of taxes paid to the 
governments and consultancy fees paid to tax advisors. While this measure still excludes 
taxes paid to internal advisors and other (non-audit) tax service providers, it is a step in 
the right direction of estimating aggregate cash outflows associated with tax planning and 
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tax compliance. I predict firms with higher insider and family ownership are more 
aggressive in tax savings, because they care more about the cash flows over book income. 
Firms with higher ownership concentration can be expected to pay less aggregate tax fees 
and taxes. My hypothesis (in alternate form) is as follows: 
Hypothesis 6: Ceteris paribus, firms with higher insider/family ownership pay less in 
aggregate tax fees and taxes. 
3. Data and research design 
3.1 Data 
Data on tax fees and statutory tax rates6 for the largest 300 Canadian firms listed on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX 300) were collected from Annual Information Form 
(AIF) and annual Management Information Circulars (MICs) for the years 2005-2008 
inclusive.7 Information about dual class and principal shareholders8 were also collected 
from annual MICs. Insider and family ownership data were retrieved from Bloomberg. 
All other financial statement data were retrieved from Compustat. 
6 Firms have the choice of disclosing statutory tax rates or dollar amounts. Firms also have to disclose 
effective tax rates and income tax expense. Effective tax rates used to calculate statutory tax rates are 
collected form Management Information Circulars (MICs). 
7 Annual Information Form and Annual Management Information Circulars are available on 
www.sedar.com 
8 Principal shareholders are shareholders who directly or indirectly own more than 10% of the voting 
shares. 
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Of the 1,2009 Canadian firm-year observations, 312 firm-year observations did not 
have sufficient tax fees data in their AIFs. The resulting dataset was first merged with 
ownership data from Bloomberg, and the remaining data merged with financial statement 
and market data retrieved from Compustat. Missing data resulted in a final sample of 67 4 
Canadian firm-years. The sample selection procedure is summarized in Table 1.1. 
A preliminary analysis of the data indicated some extreme values. To control for the 
effect of these outliers on the results, all of the continuous variables were winsorized by 
one percent at the top and bottom, including the sum of taxes paid and tax fees, total 
assets, size, pretax ROA, market-to-book ratio, leverage and intangible assets. 10 
3 .2 Measures of Tax aggressiveness 
I follow the method used in Frank et al. (2009) to measure tax aggressiveness. Frank 
et al. (2009) demonstrate how this measurement is superior to other measures. 
The model used to calculate DT AX or the residual ( e) is based on Frank et al' s 
equation 1 (Frank et al. 2009, pg. 473): 
PERMDIFF it= Po +P1INTANGit +P2UNCONit +p3 Mlit+p4 CSTEit +Ps ~NOLit+P6 
LAGPERMit + Eit (equation 1) 
where: 
PERMDIFF it= {pre-tax book income- [(federal income tax expense+ foreign income 
tax expense )/Statutory Tax Rate]} - (deferred income tax expense/ Statutory Tax Rate); 
9 300 finns x 4 years = 1,200 finn-years. 
10 Winsorizing by 0.5% at both ends did not change the results qualitatively. 
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INT ANG it = intangibles assets; 
UNCON it =income (loss) reported under the equity method; 
MI it = income (loss) attributable to minority interest; 
CSTE it = state income tax expense; 
6NOL it= change in tax loss carryforwards from last year to current year; 
LAGPERM it= one-year lagged PERMDIFF; and 
Eit =discretionary permanent difference (DT AX). 
The DFIN is the residual of the following equation 2 based on Frank et al. 2009 (pg. 
479) and then adjusted for industry average: 
TACCit =ao +a1 (6REVirdARit) +a3 PPEit -M'tit (equation 2) 
Where: 
TACCit =total accruals= (EBElit - TTEit) - [(CFOit - ITPit) - EIDOit]; 
EBElit =earnings before extraordinary items from the statement of cash flow; 
TTEit = total tax expense; 
CFOit = cash flow from operations; 
ITPit =income taxes paid from the statement of cash flow; 
EIDOit = extraordinary items and discontinued operations from the statement of cash 
flow; 
6REVit = change in sales from year t-1 to year t; 
MRit = change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t; 
PPEit =gross property, plant, and equipment; and 
llit =discretionary accruals before adjusting for performance. 
I follow Frank et al. (2009) to estimate DTAX and DFIN, and use it as proxies for 
tax and financial reporting aggressiveness, respectively. Both models above control for 
industries at the first-two digit SICs. 
3 .3 Research design 
To test my first three hypotheses, I use tax aggressiveness as my dependent variable 
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and control for the basic determinants of tax aggressiveness such as pretax performance, 
size, growth, leverage, financial reporting cost, loss carry-forward, foreign taxes paid and 
intangible assets (similar to Chen et al. 2010 and Frank et al. 2009). I then incorporate 
my two test variables: a continuous variable for financial reporting aggressiveness and an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the Canadian firm-year has higher insider 
and family ownership than the sample average, and zero otherwise. Formally my model 1 
is: 
DT AXit = Po+ P1 DFINit + P2 IFOit + p3 DFINit *IFOit + p4 FR Cit+ Ps MTBit + P6 LEVit + 
P1PTROAit + PsFORTAXit + p9INTANGi1+ P10 TLCFit + P11 SIZEit + P12-14 Year+ Eit 
(model 1) 
Where: 
DTAXit or Tax Aggressiveness =the proxy for tax aggressiveness based on Frank et al. 
(2009); 
DFINit or Financial Reporting Aggressiveness= the proxy for financial reporting 
aggressiveness calculated following Frank et al. (2009) ; 
IFOit =Insider and/or Family Ownership= an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm's 
family and/or insider ownership is above the sample average family and /or insider 
ownership, and 0 otherwise; 
FRCit =Financial Reporting Cost coded as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
if the firm's ROA is below target ROA; target ROA is calculated following Klassen and 
Mawani (2000) as follows: Target ROAt = {(1 +driftt) (NI1-1 I BV1-2)}, where driftt = (1 I 
2)Target ROAt-1 + (1I4)Target ROAt- 2 + (1 /8)Target ROAt-3+(1I16)Target ROAt-4 + 
(1I16)Target ROA1-s; 
MTBit = Market to book ratio calculated as the market value of common equity divided 
by book value of common equity at end of current year; 
LEVit =Leverage calculated as long-term debt at current year-end divided by book value 
of equity at current year-end; 
PTROAit =Pretax ROA calculated as the pretax income for firm i in year t divided by 
total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
FORTAXit =Foreign Tax proxied by an indicator variable that equals 1 ifforeign tax 
expenses are positive, and 0 otherwise; 
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INT AN Git= Intangible Assets (as% of total assets t-1) calculated as intangible assets for 
firm i in year t divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
TLCFit =Tax Loss Carryforward proxied as an indicator variable that equals 1 if tax loss 
carryforward is positive, and 0 otherwise; and 
SIZEit = Size = natural log of total assets. 
As claimed in hypothesis 1, the sign of P1 is not predicted allowing tax aggressiveness 
and financial reporting aggressiveness to be positively or negatively associated. As 
claimed in hypothesis 2, the interaction of family/insider ownership and financial 
reporting aggressiveness (p3) is expected be the significant but the sign is not predicted. 
As claimed in hypothesis 3, tax aggressiveness (p2) is expected to be significantly 
associated with insider/family ownership. Leverage and market-to-book ratio are proxies 
for financial reporting costs and predicted to be negatively associated with tax 
aggressiveness. When pretax income is higher, firms may pursue tax savings more even 
at the cost of reducing the (higher) pretax incomes. Intangible assets and foreign taxes are 
proxies for opportunities for tax planning. However, it is not certain whether such firms 
use these opportunities to reduce tax payments, improve reported income, or both (Mills 
et al. 1998). Tax loss carryforwards are tax shields that can reduce tax burdens, thereby 
reducing the need for additional tax aggressiveness. It is therefore expected to be 
negatively associated with tax aggressiveness. Larger firms may be less tax aggressive 
because they have relatively more stable incomes (due to their greater diversification) or 
they may be more tax aggressive due to the greater opportunities to engage in tax 
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planning. 
To test hypotheses 4 and 5, I use the same model as above, but substitute Dual Class 
for Insider/Family Ownership, as follows: 
DT AXit = Po+ P1 DFINit + P2 DUALit + p3 DFINit * DUALit + P4 FR Cit+ Ps MTBit + P6 
LEVit + P1 PTROAit + Ps FORTAXit + p9 INTANGit+ P10 TLCFit + P11 SIZEit + P12-14 
Year + Sit (model 2) 
where: 
DUAL refers to dual class voting. I use two measures of Dual Class: 
DUAL= an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm has more than one class of shares, and 
zero otherwise; and 
DUALl =an indicator variable equals 1 ifthe firm has more than one class of shares and 
also has a principal shareholder, who directly or indirectly owns more than 10% of the 
voting shares, and zero otherwise. 
The coefficient of Dual Class is expected to be significant but the sign is not 
predicted (H4), and the interaction term of Dual Class and DFIN is expected to be 
significant (H5). The predictions for all other variables are the same as in the previous 
model. 
To test hypothesis 6, I estimate the following regression model 3: 
Sum of taxes paid and tax fees = Po+ P1 IFOit + P2 FR Cit + p3 MTBit + p4 LEVit + Ps 
FORTAXit + P6 TLCFit + P1 DEPit + Ps ASSETSit + P Year+ P Industry Indicators+ Sit 
(model 3) 
The variables are defined in the same way as in the previous models. As claimed in 
my hypothesis 4, the sum of taxes paid and tax fees is hypothesized to be lower in firms 
with higher insider/family ownership. 
Leverage and market-to-book ratios are proxies for financial reporting costs and are 
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hypothesized to be positively associated with the aggregate of taxes paid and tax 
consulting fees. Foreign taxes are proxies for tax planning opportunities, where firms 
may spend more on tax fees to take advantage of such opportunities and therefore pay 
less in taxes. Depreciation expenses and tax loss carry-forward can reduce tax burdens 
and are therefore hypothesized to be negatively associated with the aggregate of taxes 
paid and tax fees. Larger firms are hypothesized to spend more on tax fees and taxes 
payments due to scale effect. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics for the pooled sample are reported in Table 1.2. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics for dependent variables and Panel B reports descriptive statistics for 
continuous independent variables: insider and family ownership (as a continuous 
variable), total assets, size, pretax ROA, market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio and 
intangible assets as a percentage of total assets. 
The mean level of tax aggressiveness for firms with higher insider/family ownership 
is higher than the mean for non-insider/family firms 11 , while the mean financial reporting 
aggressiveness for firms with higher insider/family ownership is lower than the mean of 
11 Ifl divided the samples into dual class firms and non-dual class firms, I get similar results: the mean tax 
aggressiveness of dual class firms is greater than the mean tax aggressiveness of non-dual class firms. 
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non-insider/family firms. These results suggest that firms with higher insider and family 
ownership may care more about pursuing tax savings and not as much about pursuing 
higher reported incomes. 
Panel C presents descriptive statistics for insider/family ownership, Dual Class, 
Dual Class 1, FRC, Foreign tax and tax loss carryforwards. As expected, closely-held 
firms are smaller than widely held firms. Approximately one third of the sample 
firm-years have dual class share structures. 
Table 1.3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the independent variables. No 
correlation is higher than 32%12, thereby suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
significant concern. 
4.2 Regression results for hypotheses 1-5 (Table 1.4) 
The regression results for hypotheses 1-5 using tax aggressiveness as the dependent 
variable are presented in Table 1.4. In column 1, I exclude ownership and interaction 
from model 1. Tax aggressiveness is negatively and significantly associated with 
financial reporting aggressiveness, suggesting that firms make tradeoffs between taxes 
and book incomes, thereby supporting hypothesis 1. Tax aggressiveness is negatively and 
significantly associated with market-to-book ratio, suggesting that growth firms facing 
12 The only exception is the 90% correlation between DUAL and DUAL I which is expected by 
construction. 
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higher financial reporting pressures may be sacrificing tax savings to report higher 
earnings to impress the capital markets. The coefficient of Pre-tax ROA is positive and 
significant, consistent with my prediction that firms with higher earnings have more 
incentives to save taxes. Leverage is positively and significantly associated with tax 
aggressiveness, contrary to my hypothesis. Tax aggressiveness is negatively associated 
with intangible assets (as a proportion of total assets at the beginning of the year), 
suggesting that perhaps firms are not using intangible assets as opportunities for tax 
planning. 
In column 2, I include insider/family ownership and the associated interaction term in 
addition to all the other independent variables. I find tax aggressiveness to be negatively 
associated with financial reporting aggressiveness, suggesting the existence of tradeoffs 
between tax savings and reported eamings, thereby supporting hypothesis 1. This finding 
is consistent with most of the literature summarized in Shackelford and Shevlin (2001 ). 
The interaction term of financial reporting aggressiveness and insider/family ownership 
is also positively associated with tax aggressiveness, suggesting that firms with 
insider/family ownerships make different tradeoffs between tax savings and reported 
earnings, thereby supporting hypothesis 2. The sum of the coefficient on financial 
reporting aggressiveness and the coefficient on the interaction term (between financial 
reporting aggressiveness and insider/family ownership) is also positively associated with 
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tax aggressiveness, 13 suggesting a positive association between tax aggressiveness and 
financial reporting aggressiveness for firms with insider/family ownership. This result is 
consistent with Frank et al. (2009). Finally, tax aggressiveness is positively associated 
with insider/family firms, suggesting that firms with higher insider/family ownership 
may be more tax aggressiveness, thereby supporting hypotheses 3 and consistent with 
Klassen (1997). Most control variables are similar in their statistical significance across 
columns 1 and 2, except that market-to-book ratio and leverage is insignificant in column 
2. 
In columns 3 and 4, I use Dual Class and Dual Class 1, respectively, as the proxy for 
closely-held firms. The regression results support hypotheses 4 and 5. After adding Dual 
Class and Dual Class 1, tax aggressiveness is still negatively associated with financial 
reporting aggressiveness, suggesting the existence of tradeoffs between tax savings and 
reported earnings, thereby supporting hypothesis 1. The interaction term of financial 
reporting aggressiveness and Dual Class (or Dual Class 1) is positively associated with 
tax aggressiveness, suggesting that firms with dual class share structures make different 
tradeoffs between tax savings and reported earnings, thereby supporting hypothesis 4. 
The sum of the coefficient on financial reporting aggressiveness and the coefficient on 
the interactioriterm (between financial reporting aggressiveness and dual class/dual class 
13 The p-value of the hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients is zero is< 0.001. 
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1) is also positively associated with tax aggressiveness, 14 suggesting dual class firms do 
not make tradeoffs between financial reporting aggressiveness and tax aggressiveness. 
Tax aggressiveness is positively associated with Dual Class and Dual Class 1, suggesting 
that dual class firms are more tax aggressiveness, supporting hypothesis 5. The results for 
control variables are generally consistent with column 1. 
4.3 Regression results for hypotheses 6 (Table 1.5) 
The sum of taxes paid and tax fees is negatively associated with insider/family 
ownership. On average, firms with higher insider and family ownership pay C$42 million 
lower in taxes and tax fees combined compared with other firms. Foreign tax indicator is 
positively associated with the sum of taxes and tax fees, suggesting that perhaps firms 
pay higher tax advisory fees when they are subject to foreign taxes (consistent with Mills 
et al. 1998) or pay more taxes when they operate in several jurisdictions. Finally, larger 
firms pay more in taxes and tax fees combined. 
4.4 Additional Tests (Table 1.6) 
Frank et al. (2009) argue that the growing trend in book-tax differences is driven by 
firms being more aggressive in tax reporting and/or financial reporting over time. The 
14 The p-value of the hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients is zero is 0.006 and 0.009 for DUAL 
and DUAL 1, respectively. 
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increasing book-tax gap over recent years may imply that firms are making tradeoffs to a 
lesser extent since large gaps suggests that firms are not able to achieve both objectives. 
To test this argument, I add indicator variables for each year, which allows tax 
aggressiveness to vary by year after controlling for the economic determinants of tax and 
financial reporting aggressiveness, such as firm performance, leverage, etc. I also 
introduce interaction variables between financial reporting aggressiveness and years to 
models 1 and 2, thereby allowing the association between the tax and financial reporting 
aggressiveness to vary over time. I hypothesize the interactions of year and financial 
reporting aggressiveness to be positive. Formally the models are as follows: 
DTAXit =Po+ P1 DFINit + P2IFOit+ p3DFINit*IFOit+ p4 Year 2006 * DFINit + Ps Year 
2007 * DFINit + P6 Year 2008 * DFINit + P1 FRCit + Ps MTBit + p9 LEVit + P10 PTROAit 
+ P11 FORTAXit + P12 INTANGit+ PB TLCFit + P14 SIZEit + P1s-11 Year+ Eit 
(model 4) 
DT AXit =Po+ P1 DFINit + P2 DUALit + p3 DFINit*DUALit + p4 Year 2006 * DFINit + Ps 
Year 2007 * DFINit + P6 Year 2008 * DFINit + P1 FRCit + Ps MTBit + p9 LEVit + P10 
PTROAit + P11 FORTAXit + P12INTANGi1+ p13 TLCFit + P14 SIZEit + P1s-11 Year+ Eit 
(model 5) 
Similar to Table 1.4, the ownership variable and its interaction with financial 
reporting aggressiveness are excluded from the model in column 1. After controlling for 
year indicator variables and the associated interaction terms, tax reporting aggressiveness 
is negatively associated with financial reporting aggressiveness, consistent with the result 
in Table 1.4, and thereby supporting hypothesis 1. In all columns 1-4, the coefficient of 
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interaction between year 2007(2008) and financial reporting aggressiveness is positive 
and significant, suggesting Canadian firms make tradeoffs to a lesser extent in the year 
2007(2008) compared to 2005. The argument that tradeoffs are mitigating over time is 
supported. 
After introducing the year effects, hypotheses 2-5 also remain supported by the data. 
In column 2, the coefficient of insider and family ownership is positive and significant, 
suggesting closely-held firms are more aggressive in tax savings, thereby supported 
hypothesis 3. Similarly, the coefficients of DAUL and DUALl are positive and 
significant in column 3 and 4 respectively, thereby supported hypothesis 5. The 
coefficient of interaction between ownership/dual class shares and financial reporting 
aggressiveness is also positive and significant, thereby suggesting that closely-held firms 
make different tradeoffs compared to widely-held firms, and hypotheses 2 and 4 are 
supported. 
4.5 Reconciling to the prior literature 
The result reported in tables 1.4 and 1.6, that tax aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness are positively associated, is inconsistent with that found by 
Frank et al. (2009). However, it is generally consistent with the other studies summarized 
by Shackelford and Shevlin (2001). Further, it is also consistent with a recent study by 
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Lennox et al. (2013) which finds that tax aggressive firms are less likely to commit 
accounting fraud, suggesting a trade-off between tax savings and reported income. The 
difference in this result from Frank et al. (2009) could be due to the Canadian setting 
with its different institutional environment and/or higher tax enforcement. Such 
jurisdictional differences could explain some of the differences in the tradeoffs taken by 
Canadian and U.S. firms. 
The results reported in table 1.4 and 1.6 - that closely-held firms are more tax 
aggressive - are inconsistent with that found by Chen et al. (2010). This study differs 
from Chen et al. (2010) along a number of dimensions. First, my sample period (2005 to 
2008) is more recent than the 1996-2000 period used by Chen et al. (2010). Second, this 
study controls for financial reporting cost, while Chen et al. (2010) do not. Third, I 
consider both insider and family ownership, while Chen et al. (2010) only examines 
family firms. Finally, the objective of Chen et al. (2010) is to test whether family firms 
are more or less aggressive in tax planning, while the objective of this study is to 
examine the extent of trade-offs (if any) between tax aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness. On replicating Chen et al 's (2010) model to my Canadian data, 
I do not find results that support their hypothesis that insider and family firms are more 
tax aggressive. When I introduce financial reporting cost to Chen et al. 's model, the 
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coefficient of ownership still remains insignificant, while financial reporting cost is 
found to be significantly associated with effective tax rate. 
4.6 Robustness Tests 
For robustness, I use a continuous variable of insider/family ownership and two 
additional dummy variables for testing hypotheses 1 to 3, and the results are reported in 
Table 1.7. I code insider/family ownership as 1 if the aggregate percentage of shares 
owned by insider and I or family is higher than 5% (10%), and 0 otherwise. The 
regression results with continuous measure of ownership as well as 5% and 10% cutoff 
points are reported in the first three columns of Table 1. 7. Tax aggressiveness is 
negatively associated with financial reporting aggressiveness. In general, firms with 
higher insider/family ownership are more aggressive than other firms, and tradeoff 
differently from other firms. Consistent with results in table 1.4, hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 
are all supported. 
I conduct another set of robustness tests by using ETRs as tax aggressiveness 
measures (untabulated). As discussed in the methodology section, ETR can be affected 
by both earnings management and tax management. Only Cash ETR support all three 
hypotheses, while the other two measures 15 only support some of the hypotheses. 
15 ETRl =Total tax expense/ Pretax income. 
ETR2 =(Total tax expense - Change in deferred tax) I Operating cash flows (following Zimmerman 1983) 
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5. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the debate on whether firms tradeoff between tax savings 
and reported income. Frank et al. (2009) find that tax aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness are positively correlated, a result that deviates from most of the 
literature prior to it (as summarized in Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). 
I find that while tax aggressiveness is negatively associated with financial reporting 
aggressiveness in general, firms with higher insider and family ownership tradeoff 
differently, and firms with dual class share structure also tradeoff differently between the 
two factors. Firms with insider and family concentrated ownership are more aggressive 
in pursuing tax savings compared to other firms, allowing them to enjoy paying $42 
million less in combined taxes (to governments) and tax fees (to tax advisors). 
The limitations of this study apply to many other studies in this literature that adapt 
Frank et al's (2009) measures of tax and financial reporting aggressiveness. Frank et al's 
definition of tax aggressiveness only includes downward management of taxable incomes 
while in practice tax aggressiveness could include overstating taxable incomes in some 
periods (e.g., those with loss carryovers). Similarly, Frank et al's (2009) definition of 
ETR3 =Cash taxes paid/Pretax income (following Chen et al. 2010) 
The dependent variable (DFRA) is the residual from total accrual equation divided by pretax income. The 
other independent variables are defined in Table 2. P-Values are presented in parentheses. 
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financial reporting aggressiveness only includes upward management of reported 
earnings, while in practice earnings management could include understating reported 
earnings. 
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Table 1.1 Sample Selection 
Initial Sample (firm-year observations) 1200 (a) 
Deletions due to missing data for 
Tax aggressiveness data in Compustat -121 
Financial Reporting Aggressiveness in 
-7 Compustat 
Market-to-Book ratio in Compustat -127 
Leverage in Compustat -2 
Sample used in Table 1.4, column 1 943 
Deletions due to missing data for 
Insider/Family Ownership in Bloomberg -269 
Sample used in Table 1.4, column 2 674 
Initial Sample (firm-year observations) 1200 (a) 
Deletions due to missing data for 
Tax fees on Sedar -312 
Insider/Family Ownership in Bloomberg -144 
Operating expenses in Compustat -22 
Pretax ROA in Compustat -12 
Market-To-Book ratio in Compustat -71 
Leverage in Compustat -2 
Depreciation (as% of total assets t-I) in 
-22 Compustat 
ETR in Compustat -40 
Intangible assets(% of total assets t-I) in 
-6 Compustat 
FRC in Compustat -4 
Sample used in Table 1.5 565 
(a) TSX 300 firms for 2005-2008 
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Table 1.2 Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Firms with higher insider/family Firms with lower insider/family 
ownership ownership 
Variables N Mean Median Std Dev N Mean Median Std Dev 
DTAX 154 0.011 0.001 0.117 520 0.003 0.012 0.134 
DFIN 154 -0.018 -0.153 0.099 520 0.013 0.003 0.125 
Sum of taxes 
paid and tax 
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fees 
37 14 60 453 162 29 282 
(C$ million) 
Panel B: Continuous Variables 
Firms with higher insider/family Firms with lower insider/family 
ownership ownership 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev N Mean Median Std Dev 
IFO (%) 154 18.768 14.619 11.764 520 0.91 0.484 1.063 
ASSETS 154 7,747 1,863 23,589 520 21,060 2,788 68,783 
SIZE 154 7.741 7.530 1.226 520 8.249 7.933 1.510 
PTROA 154 0.108 0.074 0.099 520 0.119 0.101 0.105 
MTB 154 2.287 1.766 1.934 520 2.151 1.905 1.458 
LEV 154 0.944 0.523 1.252 520 0.705 0.427 1.056 
INT ANG 154 0.228 0.100 0.303 520 0.150 0.046 0.279 
Panel C: Discrete variables 
Variable N Percent N Percent 
IFO 1 154 22.85% 0 520 77.15% 
DUAL 1 249 27.24% 0 665 72.76% 
DUALl 1 218 24.80% 0 661 75.20% 
FRC 1 325 48.22% 0 349 51.78% 
FORT AX 1 132 19.58% 0 542 80.42% 
TLCF 1 163 24.18% 0 511 75.82% 
Variable definitions 
Dependent variables: 
DT AX or Tax Aggressiveness = the proxy for tax aggressiveness based on Frank et al. (2009); 
DFIN or Financial Reporting Aggressiveness= the proxy for financial reporting aggressiveness 
calculated following Frank et al. (2009) ; 
Independent variables: 
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SIZE = Size = natural log of total assets; 
PTROA = Pretax ROA calculated as the pretax income for firm i in year t divided by total assets 
for firm i in year t-1; 
MTB = Market to book ratio calculated as the market value of common equity divided by book 
value of common equity at end of current year; 
LEV =Leverage calculated as long-term debt at current year-end divided by book value of 
equity at current year-end; 
INTANG =Intangible Assets (as% of total assets t-i) calculated as intangible assets for firm i in 
year t divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
Discrete variables: 
IFO =Insider/Family Ownership= an indicator variable that equals 1 ifthe firm's family and 
insider ownership is above the sample average family and insider ownership, and 0 otherwise; 
DUAL= indicator variable that equals 1 ifthe firm has more than one class of shares, and zero 
otherwise; 
DUAL 1 =indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one class of shares and also 
has a principal shareholder, who directly or indirectly owns more than 10% of the voting shares, 
and zero otherwise; 
FRC = Financial Reporting Cost coded as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm's ROA is below target ROA; target ROA is calculated following Klassen and Mawani 
(2000) as follows: Target ROAt = {(l+driftt) (Nit-I I BVt-2)}, where driftt = (1 /2)Target ROAt-I 
+ (1I4)Target ROAt- 2 + (1 /8)Target ROAt-3 + (1Il6)Target ROAt-4+(1I16)Target ROAt_5; 
TLCF =Tax Loss Carryforward proxied as an indicator variable that equals 1 if tax loss 
carryforward is positive, and 0 otherwise; and 
FORTAX=Foreign Tax proxied by an indicator variable that equals 1 if foreign tax expenses 
are positive, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1.3: Pearson Correlation 
DFIN DUAL DUALl IFO FORT AX TLCF MTB LEV PTROA INT ANG 
DUAL -0.026 1.000 
(0.494) 
DUAL -0.044 0.956 1.000 
(0.263) (0.000) 
IFO -0.109 0.212 0.222 1.000 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
FORT AX -0.020 0.064 0.016 -0.126 1.000 
(0.604) (0.098) (0.693) (0.001) 
TLCF -0.129 0.140 0.140 0.028 0.096 1.000 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.463) (0.013) 
MTB 0.032 -0.160 -0.148 0.036 0.076 -0.208 1.000 
(0.401) (0.000) (0.000) (0.348) (0.050) (0.000) 
LEV -0.041 0.148 0.142 0.091 0.010 0.105 0.025 1.000 
(0.288) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.792) (0.007) (0.524) 
PTROA 0.096 -0.106 -0.119 -0.044 -0.088 -0.102 0.295 -0.204 1.000 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.002) (0.254) (0.023) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
INT ANG 0.062 0.125 0.130 0.115 0.000 0.111 -0.033 0.022 0.070 1.000 
(0.108) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.992) (0.004) (0.399) (0.564) (0.070) 
SIZE 0.076 0.060 0.017 -0.146 0.317 -0.034 0.020 0.010 -0.090 -0.074 
(0.048) (0.120) (0.662) (0.000) (0.000) (0.377) (0.614) (0.798) (0.020) (0.054) 
Note: 
This table presents Pearson Correlation among variables. The variables are defined in Table 1.2. P-Values are presented in 
parentheses. 
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Table 1.4: Association between Tax Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting 
Aggressiveness 
DTAXit =Po+ P1 DFINit + P2IFOit+ p3DFINit*IFOit+ p4FRCit + Ps MTBit+ P6LEVit + 
P1PTROAit + PsFORTAXit + p9INTANGit+ P10 TLCFit +Pu SIZEit + P12-14 Year+ Eit 
Dependent variable 
DTAX Pred Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Intercept 0.027 0.016 0.024 0.021 
(0.362) (0.610) (0.424) (0.488) 
DFIN (Hl)? -0.097*** -0.118··· -0.125*** -0.126*** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
IFO (H3)? 0.028·· 
(0.016) 
DFIN*IFO (H2)? 0.594*** 
(0.000) 
DUAL (HS)? 0.034*** 
(0.001) 
DFIN*DUAL (H4)? 0.210** 
(0.049) 
DUALl (HS)? o.o3o··· 
(0.005) 
DFIN*DUALl (H4)? 0.209* 
(0.065) 
FRC -0.012 -0.016 -0.010 -0.006 
(0.180) (0.105) (0.307) (0.559) 
MTB -0.001··· -0.001 -0.005·· -0.005·• 
(0.003) (0.799) (0.040) (0.033) 
LEV 0.010··· o.oos 0.008·· 0.008·· 
(0.008) (0.247) (0.030) (0.046) 
PTROA + 0.183*** 0.231*** 0.190*** 0.203*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FORTAX ? -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 
(0.438) (0.40S) (0.384) (0.321) 
INTANG ? -0.136 ... -0.148··· -0.140··· -0.132*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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TLCF - -0.010 -0.005 -0.013 -0.010 
(0.260) (0.648) (0.163) (0.281) 
SIZE ? -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.848) (0.808) (0.616) (0.662) 
Adj. R2 0.091 0.166 0.106 0.099 
No. of observations 943 674 914 879 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 using a pooled 
ordinary least squares estimation. There are 943/674/914/879 firm-year 
observations over the period 2005 to 2008. The dependent measures and 
independent variables are defined in Table 1.2. P-Values are presented in 
parentheses. 
* * * Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
* * Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Table 1.5: Tax Reporting and Insider/Family ownership 
Sum of taxes paid and tax fees=Po+ P1 IFOit+ P2FRCit + p3 MTBit + p4LEVit + Ps 
FORTAXit + P6 TLCFit + P1 DEPit + Ps ASSETSit + P Year+ P Industry Indicators+ Eit 
Dependent variable: Sum of taxes and tax fees Pred OLS 
Intercept 35.947 
(0.342) 
IFO (H6)- -42.216* 
(0.077) 
FRC + -16.281 
(0.350) 
MTB + 2.932 
(0.656) 
LEV + -5.775 
(0.503) 
FORT AX ? 102.382*** 
(0.000) 
TLCF - 8.411 
(0.653) 
DEP - 35.961 
(0.349) 
ASSETS + 0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Year indicator Included 
Industry Indicator Included 
Adj. R2 0.596 
No. of observations 565 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of hypothesis 6 using a pooled ordinary 
least squares estimation. There are 565 firm-year observations over the period 
2005 to 2008. The dependent and independent variables are defined in Table 
1.2. P-Values are presented in parentheses. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Table 1.6: The Tradeoff Trend over Time 
DTAXit =Po+ P1 DFINit + P2 IFOit+ p3 DFINit*IFOit+ p4 Year 2006 * DFINit + Ps Year 
2007 * DFINit + P6 Year 2008 * DFINit + P1 FRCit + Ps MTBit + p9 LEVit + P10 PTROAit 
+ P11 FORTAXit + P12 INTANGit+ Pn TLCFit + P14 SIZEit + P1s-11 Year+ Eit 
Dependent variable 
DTAX Pred Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Intercept 0.045 0.032 0.040 0.038 
(0.131) (0.307) (0.178) (0.212) 
DFIN (Hl)? -0.170 ... -0.289··· -0.190 ... -0.188··· 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) 
IFO (H3)? 0.027 .. 
(0.015) 
DFIN*IFO (H2)? o.5oo··· 
(0.000) 
DUAL (HS)? 0.032··· 
(0.001) 
DFIN*DUAL (H4)? 0.191 * 
(0.073) 
DUALl (HS)? 0.029*** 
(0.007) 
DFIN*DUALl (H4)? 0.194* 
(0.085) 
Year 2006 * DFIN + -0.132 0.013 -0.114 -0.110 
(0.128) (0.896) (0.191) (0.212) 
Year 2007 * DFIN + 0.255··· 0.333 ... 0.236 .. 0.231 .. 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.023) 
Year 2008 * DFIN + 0.232··· 0.606 ... 0.209** 0.194•• 
(0.009) (0.000) (0.020) (0.033) 
FRC -0.007 -0.010 -0.005 -0.002 
(0.447) (0.285) (0.567) (0.852) 
MTB -0.008··· -0.001 -0.006 •• -0.006 .. 
(0.001) (0.790) (0.019) (0.016) 
LEV 0.010··· 0.004 0.008·· 0.008·· 
(0.009) (0.298) (0.031) (0.047) 
PTROA + 0.188 ... 0.225••• 0.194 ... 0.205••• 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FORTAX ? -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 
(0.356) (0.376) (0.321) (0.282) 
INTANG ? -0.13i*** -0.144*** -o.13s··· -o.12s··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TLCF - -0.014 -0.009 -0.016* -0.013 
(0.137) (0.332) (0.087) (0.157) 
SIZE ? -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.649) (0.320) (0.481) (0.525) 
Year 2006 + -0.016 0.003 -0.016 -0.016 
(0.175) (0.796) (0.192) (0.190) 
Year 2007 + -0.014 0.007 -0.012 -0.013 
(0.259) (0.587) (0.348) (0.308) 
Year 2008 + -0.018 0.002 -0.016 -0.016 
(0.158) (0.878) (0.225) (0.229) 
Adj. R2 0.112 0.210 0.121 0.114 
No. of observations 943 674 914 879 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 using a pooled 
ordinary least squares estimation. There are 943/674/914/879 firm-year observations 
over the period 2005 to 2008. The dependent measures and independent variables are 
defined in Table 1.2. P-Values are presented in parentheses. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Table 1.7: Association between tax aggressiveness and different measures of 
insider/family ownership 
DT AXit = Po+ P1 DFINt + P2 IFOit + p3 DFINit *IFOit + P4 FR Cit + Ps MTBit + P6 LEVit + 
P1PTROAit + PsFORTAXit + p9INTANGit+ P10 TLCFit + Pn SIZEit + P12-14 Year+ Eit 
Dependent variable IFO IFO Cutoff Point 
DTAX Pred Continues 5% 10% Variable 
Intercept 0.012 0.017 0.018 
(0.695) (0.579) (0.562) 
DFIN (HI)? -0.084. -0.123 ... -0.102·· 
(0.055) (0.004) (0.017) 
IFO (H3)? 0.001 • 0.023•• 0.028·· 
(0.086) (0.046) (0.028) 
DFIN*IFO (H2)? 0.011··· 0.611 ••• 0.602··· 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
FRC - -0.016 -0.015 -0.016. 
(0.110) (0.113) (0.094) 
MTB - 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.982) (0.817) (0.636) 
LEV - 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(0.231) (0.233) (0.243) 
PTROA + 0.233••• 0.231 ••• 0.230··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FORTAX ? -0.015 -0.011 -0.014 
(0.251) (0.391) (0.271) 
INTANG ? -0.148 ... -0.147 ... -0.152 ... 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TLCF - -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.677) (0.632) (0.622) 
SIZE ? -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.879) (0.785) (0.861) 
Adj. R2 0.138 0.167 0.159 
No. of observations 674 674 674 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 using a pooled 
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ordinary least squares estimation. There are 674 firm-year observations over the 
period 2005 to 2008. The dependent measures and independent variables are defined 
in Table 1.2. P-Values are presented in parentheses. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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ESSAY2 
Financial and Tax Reporting 
Aggressiveness: A Canada - U.S. 
Comparison 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines whether firms tradeoff between reporting higher book income 
and being tax aggressive to a similar extent in Canada and the United States; and whether 
the impact of ownership on this tradeoff is similar across the two countries. The literature 
is inconclusive about whether firms tradeoff between book income and taxable savings. 
Earlier literature suggested that firms made tradeoffs between the two goods: tax savings 
and reported income (e.g., Klassen 1997; Beatty and Harris 1999; Klassen and Mawani 
2000; Mawani 2003; Shackelford and Shevlin 2001). 
More recent literature (e.g., Frank et al. 2009) suggests that firms can and do pursue 
both tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness simultaneously, 
thereby implying that firms need not choose between doing only one of tax reporting 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. Tax aggressiveness is defined in 
the literature as the "downward management of taxable income through tax planning 
activities that may or may not be considered fraudulent tax reporting" (Frank et al. 2009). 
Financial reporting aggressiveness is defined as "upward earnings management that may 
or may not be within the confines of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)" 
(Frank et al. 2009). Most of the published empirical studies are based on U.S. data. This 
comparison study of U.S. and Canada can be useful in triangulating the mixed results of 
this literature, and shed some light on factors affecting the tradeoff decisions. 
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Frank et al. (2009) admit that not all firms engage in being aggressive in both tax 
planning and reported earnings. They claim that "[ e ]ven if firms have the ability to be 
aggressive for both financial and tax reporting purposes, it is not obvious that firms 
would be willing to engage in both behaviors" (p. 471). It is therefore interesting to 
examine whether firms in different jurisdictions that have different financial reporting 
standards (Canadian GAAP versus U.S. GAAP), different tax rates, different tax systems, 
and different tax enforcement behave in the same manner with regards to the tradeoff 
decision. It is also interesting to examine whether there are any particular kinds of firms 
that may engage differently in this dual aggressive behaviour, and whether such firms are 
more prevalent in one or both jurisdictions. Closely-held firms may face different 
financial reporting and tax reporting pressures, and it is possible they behave differently 
from widely-held firms. 
This study examines two questions. First, I re-examine whether firms trade-off 
between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness in each of 
the two jurisdictions. Canadian firms may behave differently from U.S. firms due to 
differences in financial reporting and tax reporting pressures and rules between the two 
countries. Second, I examine whether closely-held firms tradeoff differently between tax 
reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness compared to firms that 
are not closely-held. Closely held firms may have different priorities for both financial 
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reporting and tax reporting (e.g., Klassen, 1997). While making tradeoffs implies firms 
wish to purse two goods but are forced to emphasize only one, making different tradeoffs 
could imply three possible scenarios: (1) firms do not need to make tradeoffs (i.e., firms 
want to or are able to purse both goods simultaneously); (2) firms interested in pursuing 
only one good (e.g., tax savings only), with no significant interest in pursuing the other 
good; and (3) firms pursing neither goods. 
I examine tax and financial reporting decisions of the S&P 500 firms in the U.S. and 
TSX300 firms in Canada for the 2005 to 2008 period, inclusive. My results show that tax 
reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness are positively associated 
for U.S. firms, suggesting U.S. firms are pursing both tax savings and reporting higher 
book income simultaneously, but negatively associated for Canadian firms, suggesting 
Canadian firms do tradeoff between the two goods. U.S. closely-held firms make similar 
tradeoff decisions compared to U.S. widely-held firms. In contrast, Canadian 
closely-held firms seem to make no tradeoffs between book income and tax savings. 
My results have important implications for policy and practice. First, this study 
provides preliminary insights about financial accounting and tax reporting across the two 
jurisdictions. Second, taxes are material, with firms paying almost a third of their pretax 
income to governments in the form of taxes (Chen et al. 2010). Firms are therefore likely 
to engage in efforts to minimize such payments. Tax authorities may benefit from 
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knowing which firms are more likely to be aggressive in tax planning, and thereby target 
their scarce auditing and monitoring resources more effectively and efficiently. Third, 
external auditors can also be more effective and efficient by knowing which firms are 
more likely to be aggressive in their financial reporting. Finally, investors may also be 
interested in understanding which firms are more likely to be aggressive in financial 
reporting. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Hypotheses are developed in 
section 2 after a brief discussion of the literature. In section 3, research design and data 
are described. Section 4 presents the results from regression analyses and section 5 
summarizes and concludes. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Trade-off between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness 
Tax aggressiveness is defined in the literature as the "downward management of 
taxable income through tax planning activities that may or may not be considered 
fraudulent tax reporting" (Frank et al. 2009). Financial reporting aggressiveness is 
defined as "upward earnings management that may or may not be within the confines of 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)" ((Frank et al. 2009). 
Income taxes constitute material a material component of earnings in both countries, 
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creating strong incentives to be aggressive in reporting lower taxable incomes. However, 
firms are unlikely to simply minimize taxes payments since they need to consider 
non-tax costs such as financial reporting costs. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) define 
financial reporting costs as the costs of reporting lower income. The separation of 
management and ownership creates information asymmetry, and managers use reported 
earnings as one means to resolve such asymmetry. Managers attempt to meet or exceed 
shareholders' expectation regarding earnings. At an extreme, Erickson et al. (2004) found 
managers engaged in fraudulent financial reporting paid an additional eight cents in taxes 
to report each additional dollar of fraudulent earnings, confirming a trade-off between 
reported income and taxable savings. Consistent with Erickson et al. (2004 ), Lennox et al. 
(2013) also find that, based on five measures of tax aggressiveness, U.S. public firms 
engaging in tax aggressiveness are less likely to be involved in accounting fraud. In 
additional, firms are generally reluctant to minimize both tax costs and financial 
reporting costs. Mills (1996) finds that "Internal Revenue Service (IRS) proposed audit 
adjustments increase as the excess of book income over taxable income increases." Such 
penalties serve as the brake on aggressive tax planning. 
Frank et al. (2009) develop their own measure of tax aggressiveness in examining 
the association between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. They 
find a positive and significant association between tax aggressiveness and financial 
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reporting aggressiveness, suggesting that firms may not be making tradeoffs between the 
pursuit of these book income and tax savings. 
Due to the inconclusive evidence in literature, I do not predict the sign of the 
relationship. My hypothesis 1 (in alternate form) is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, tax aggressiveness is associated with financial 
reporting aggressiveness. 
2.2 Tradeoffs across jurisdictions 
Compared with U.S. firms, Canadian firms may be more or less aggressive in 
financial reporting. The differences could be driven by differences in corporate 
governance regimes that can impose some influence on earnings management. Aggarwal 
et al. (2007), for example, compare the corporate governance of non-U.S. firms with U.S. 
firms. Using an index of firm governance attributes, they found Canadian firms to have 
better governance than matching U.S. firms. Xie et al. (2003) found corporate 
governance could prevent earnings management. If Canadian firms do indeed have better 
corporate governance, they may be less likely to manage their earnings, and therefore 
less likely to be aggressive in their financial reporting compared to U.S. firms. 
To the extent that closely-held firms have lower information asymmetry between 
shareholders and management, thereby reducing the pressure to manage reported 
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earnings and allowing managers to put more weight on tax savings (e.g., Klassen 1997). 
Several studies have shown that there are more ownership-concentrated firms in Canada 
(e.g., Ben-Amar and Andre 2006; Morck et al. 2000; Amoaku-Adu and Smith 2001; 
Smith and Amoaku-Adu 1999). Closely-held firms may also rely more on internal 
sources of funds (e.g., from the founding family or founders) and less on external sources 
of funds compar~d to widely-held firms. As a result, the average Canadian firm's 
financial reporting pressure may be arguably lower compared to the average U.S. firm, 
and they could be able to afford more tax aggressiveness compared to the average U.S. 
firm. Because of differences in firm size, it is possible that Canadian firms are more tax 
aggressive and less aggressive in financial reporting compared to U.S. firms. 
However, firms with concentrated ownership could need to report even higher book 
income to compensate the potential price discount imposed by outside shareholders, and 
they need to sacrifice tax savings to achieve financial reporting target (e.g., Chen et al. 
2010). It is also possible Canadian firms would be more aggressive in financial reporting 
and less aggressive in tax savings compared to U.S. firms. 
There is a "quiet life" theory suggesting that controlling shareholders may want to 
enjoy a quiet life and avoid costly activities (Zhao and Chen 2008). The potential costs to 
involve in earnings management and/or tax savings could be high for controlling 
shareholders (e.g., family owners or founders), such as reputation costs, personal 
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penalties (Chen et al. 2010), and the controlling shareholders may be less aggressive in 
tax savings and/or reporting higher book income. Based on such motivations, it is 
possible that Canadian firms also want to avoid financial reporting aggressiveness and/or 
tax aggressiveness, and are less aggressive in both tax savings and reporting higher book 
income. 
Canadian firms are likely to be less aggressive in their tax reporting because of more 
stringent enforcement by Canadian tax authorities compared to U.S. tax authorities. A 
typical corporation based in Ontario faced a combined federal-provincial tax rate of 26.5% 
in 2013 16 compared to 35% in the U.S. 17 Despite the lower corporate tax rates in 
Canada, corporate taxes made up 1.9% of Canada's GDP in 2012 compared to the higher 
U.S. corporate tax rates making up 1.6% of the U.S. GDP in 2012. 18 This difference may 
be explained by differences in GDP growth, differences in tax enforcement and 
differences in tax complexity that may make tax enforcement easier in Canada. The 
strong tax enforcement and different ownership structure could make Canadian firms 
tradeoff differently than U.S. firms. 
Making tradeoffs implies firms want to purse two goods (book income and tax 
16http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Tax_Rate_Card_-_2013_Corporate/$FILE/Tax-Rates-Corp 
orate-2013. pdf 
17http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/W orldwide _corporate_ tax _guide_ 20 l 2/$FILE/WCTG _ 201 
2 _Worldwide_ Corporate_ Tax_ Guide.pdf 
18 http://www.cato.org/blog/corporate-tax-low-rates-high-revenues 
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savings, in this case) but are forced to emphasize on only one (Klassen 1997). Making 
different tradeoffs could imply there are no tradeoffs (i.e., firms want to and are able to 
purse two goods simultaneously). Making different tradeoffs could also imply that firms 
are pursuing only one good (e.g., tax savings only), with no significant interest in 
pursuing the other good. While unlikely, making different tradeoffs does not preclude the 
possibility that firms are pursing neither goods. 
My hypothesis 2 (in alternate form) is as follow: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, Canadian firms make different tradeoffs between tax 
reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness compared to US. firms. 
2.3 Tax aggressiveness and ownership concentration 
Insider and /or family ownership can potentially reduce information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders, thereby potentially mitigating the need for both 
tax and financial reporting aggressiveness. 
Wolfson (1993) offers evidence that the "financial reporting consequences of tax 
planning strategies are relatively less important where business ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of relatively few investors". The finding is similar to Klassen's 
study ( 1997) which finds firms with larger inside ownership concentration take larger 
losses or smaller gains when they are highly taxable. These studies document that firms 
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with high concentration of insider and family owners makes them care more about 
reducing their taxes. In contrast, Chen et al. (2010) find that firms owned or managed by 
founding family members are less tax aggressive than non-family firms. They explain 
their results by claiming that family firms forgo tax savings to avoid potential price 
discounts imposed by shareholders, and that these family firms have higher non-tax costs 
such as the reputation costs and potential personal penalties for tax avoidance. Steijvers 
and Niskanen (2011) extend Chen et al.' s results to private firms and show that private 
family firms are less aggressive than private non-family firms. One possible reason for 
the difference in results could be that some of the studies examine only tax 
aggressiveness without controlling for financial reporting aggressiveness or financial 
reporting costs (e.g., Chen et al. 2010). 
Insider shareholders are more likely to direct their firms to minimize cash outflows 
instead of maximizing reported earnings when the latter do not necessarily represent cash 
inflows. As a result, firms with higher insider and family ownership may be more 
aggressive in their tax planning. However, it is not clear whether they would also be 
more or less aggressive in their financial reporting. 
Insider and family owned firms may face lower financial reporting costs since they 
have more inside information about the firm and rely less of formal financial reporting. 
On the other hand, insider and family owned firms may need to report higher book 
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income to compensate for the potential price discount for lower liquidity imposed by 
outside shareholders (e.g., Chen et al. 2010). 
I predict that firms with higher insider and family ownership tradeoff differently 
between tax savings and reported earnings. I aggregate insider and family ownership for 
my empirical tests to examine how the combined ownership affects firms' decisions to 
tradeoff between tax savings and reported earnings. Although insider-owned firms and 
family-owned firms are different in some aspects, they both suffer less from information 
asymmetry between outsiders and insiders. They have more information regarding the 
performance, and therefore rely less on the disclosed book income. They may share 
similar attitudes towards pursuit of tax savings, and may be tax aggressive if they can 
personally benefit from it. They may make the same tradeoff because they face the 
similar financial reporting pressure and tax reporting pressure. My hypothesis 3 (in 
alternate form) is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus,firms with higher insider/family ownership make 
different tradeoffs between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness 
compared to widely-held firms. 
3. Data and research design 
3.1 Data 
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For U.S. firms, my sample consists of Standard & Poor's 500 firms (S&P 500) for the 
years 2005-2008 inclusive. For Canadian firms, my sample consists of largest 300 firms 
listed on Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX 300) for the same period (2005-2008 inclusive). 
Both U.S. and Canadian firms' insider and family ownership data were retrieved from 
Bloomberg. Other financial statement and market data were retrieved from Compustat. 
Of the 2,00019 U.S. firm-year observations, 74 firm-year observations did not have 
sufficient ownership data in the Bloomberg database. The resulting dataset was merged 
with financial statement and market data retrieved from Compustat. Missing Compustat 
data resulted in a final sample of 1,452 U.S. firm-years20• Of the 1,20021 Canadian 
firm-year observations, 269 firm-year observations did not have sufficient ownership 
data in the Bloomberg database. The resulting dataset was merged with financial 
statement and market data retrieved from Compustat. Missing Compustat data resulted in 
a final sample of 674 Canadian firm-years. The sample selection procedure is 
summarized in table 2.1. 
A preliminary analysis of the data indicates some extreme values. To control for the 
effect of these outliers on the results, all of the continuous variables were winsorized by 
one percent at the top and bottom, including total assets, size, pretax ROA, 
19 500 firms x 4 years= 2,000 firm-years. 
2° Frank et al. (2009) lost 39% of their sample offirm-years due to missing data ((81,931-49,886)/81,931), 
while I lost 27.4% of my firm-years due to missing data. 
21 300 firms x 4 years= 1,200 firm-years. 
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market-to-book ratio, leverage and intangible assets.22 
3 .2 Measures of tax and financial reporting aggressiveness 
Commonly used measures of tax aggressiveness in the literature include: effective 
tax rate (ETR), book-tax difference (BTD) and modified ETR and BTD (e.g., cash ETR 
and permanent BTD). I use DT AX to proxy for tax aggressiveness since - compared to 
ETR and BTD - DTX is less driven by earnings management and includes more pure tax 
planning effects. Frank et al. (2009) demonstrate how this measure is superior to other 
measures. 
The model used to calculate DTAX or the residual (c) is based on the following 
equation (Frank et al. 2009, pg. 473): 
PERMDIFF it= ~o +~1INTANGit +~2UNCONit +~3 Mlit+~4 CSTEit +~s ~NOLit+~6 
LAGPERMit +cit (equation 1) 
Where: 
PERMDIFF it= {pre-tax book income - [(federal income tax expense+ foreign income 
tax expense )/Statutory Tax Rate]} - (deferred income tax expense/ Statutory Tax Rate); 
INTANG it= intangibles assets; 
UN CON it =income (loss) reported under the equity method; 
MI it = income (loss) attributable to minority interest; 
CSTE it = state income tax expense; 
~OL it= change in tax loss carryforwards from last year to current year; 
LAGPERM it= one-year lagged PERMDIFF; and 
cit =discretionary permanent difference (DT AX). 
22 Winsorizing by 0.5% at both ends did not change the results qualitatively. 
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Similar to Frank et al. (2009), I use DFIN to proxy for financial reporting 
aggressiveness. The DFIN is the residual of the following equation based on Frank et al. 
2009 (pg. 4 79), and adjusted for industry average: 
TACCit =ao +a1 (LiREVirMRit) +a3 PPEit +Ttit (equation 2) 
Where: 
TACCit =total accruals= (EBElit - TTEit) - [(CFOit - ITPit) - EIDOit]; 
EBElit =earnings before extraordinary items from the statement of cash flow; 
TTEit = total tax expense; 
CFOit = cash flow from operations; 
ITPit =income taxes paid from the statement of cash flow; 
EIDOit = extraordinary items and discontinued operations from the statement of cash 
flow; 
LiREVit = change in sales from year t-1 to year t; 
MRit = change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t; 
PPEit =gross property, plant, and equipment; and 
llit =discretionary accruals before adjusting for performance. 
The two models used to calculate DTAX and DFIN are controlled for industry 
effects using the first-two digit SICs. Earnings management and tax aggressiveness has 
been found to vary across industries (e.g. Key 1997). 
3 .3 Research design 
I examine Hypothesis 1-3 using the North American sample (i.e., both Canadian and 
U.S. firms). Similar to Chen et al. (2010) and Frank et al. (2009), I use tax aggressiveness 
as my dependent variable and control for the determinants of tax aggressiveness such as 
pretax performance, size, growth, leverage, financial reporting cost, loss carry-forward, 
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foreign taxes paid and intangible assets. I incorporate my two test variables: a continuous 
variable for financial reporting aggressiveness and an indicator variable of Canadian 
firms (i.e., CA takes on the value of 1 if the firm is based in Canada and 0 if the firm is 
based in the U.S.). To test hypothesis 2, I include the interaction of two variables in the 
model 2. In model 3, I include an indicator variable for insider and family ownership that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm-year has higher-than-average insider and family 
ownership, and zero otherwise. The interaction of the indicator of insider and family 
ownership and the financial accounting aggressiveness is also included in the model to 
test hypothesis 3. In model 4, I also include the interaction between the Canadian 
indicator, financial reporting aggressiveness and insider/family ownership to examine 
whether Canadian closely-held firms behave differently in their tradeoff decisions from 
other firms. Formally, my model is: 
DTAXit =Po+ P1 DFINit + P2FRCit + p3 MTBit + p4LEVit + PsPTROAit + P6FORTAXit 
+ P1 INTANGit+ Ps TLCFit + p9 SIZEit +cit (model 1) 
DT AXit = Po+ P1 DFINit + P2 CAit +p3 DFINit * CAit + p4 FRCit + Ps MTBit + P6 LEVit + 
P1PTROAit + PsFORTAXit + p9INTANGi1+ P10 TLCFit + P11 SIZEit +cit 
(model 2) 
DT AXit = Po+ P1 DFINit + P2 IFOit + p3 DFINit *IFOit + p4 CA +Ps FR Cit+ P6 MTBit + P1 
LEVit + PsPTROAit + p9FORTAXit + P10INTANGit+ P11 TLCFit + P12SIZEit +cit 
(model 3) 
DT AXit = Po+ P1 DFINit + P2 CAit +p3 DFINit * CAit +p4 IFOit + Ps DFINit* IFOit +p6 CAit 
* IFOit +P1 DFINit * IFOit * CAit + Ps FR Cit + p9 MTBit + P10 LEVit + P11 PTROAit + P12 
FORTAXit + Pn INTANGit+ P14 TLCFit +Pis SIZEit +cit (model 4) 
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where: 
DTAXit or Tax Aggressiveness =the proxy for tax aggressiveness based on Frank et al. 
(2009); 
DFINit or Financial Reporting Aggressiveness= the proxy for financial reporting 
aggressiveness calculated following Frank et al. (2009) ; 
IFOit =Insider/Family Ownership= an indicator variable that equals 1 ifthe firm's family 
and insider ownership is above the sample average family and insider ownership, and 0 
otherwise; 
FRCit =Financial Reporting Cost coded as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
ifthe firm's ROA is below target ROA; target ROA is calculated following Klassen and 
Mawani (2000) as follows: Target ROA1 = { (1 +drift1) (Nl1_1 I BV1_2)}, where drift1 = (1 I 
2)Target ROA1_1+(1I4)Target ROA1-2 + (1 /8)Target ROAt-3 + (1 /16)Target ROAt-4 + 
(1Il6)Target ROA1-s; 
MTBit = Market to book ratio calculated as the market value of common equity divided 
by book value of common equity at end of current year; 
LEVit =Leverage calculated as long-term debt at current year-end divided by book value 
of equity at current year-end; 
PTROAit = Pretax ROA calculated as the pretax income for firm i in year t divided by 
total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
FORTAXit =Foreign Tax proxied by an indicator variable that equals 1 if foreign tax 
expenses are positive, and 0 otherwise; 
INTANGit =Intangible Assets (as% of total assets t-1) calculated as intangible assets for 
firm i in year t divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
TLCFit =Tax Loss Carryforward proxied as an indicator variable that equals 1 if tax loss 
carryforward is positive, and 0 otherwise; 
SIZEit = Size = natural log of total assets; and 
CA = Canadian firm indicator which takes a value of 1 if the firm is based in Canada and 
0 if the firm is based in the U.S. 
In model 1, as stated in hypothesis 1, the sign of~ 1 which captures the direction of 
association between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness is not 
predicted. In model 2, the sign of coefficient ~2 (CA) is not predicted to reflect the fact 
that Canadian firms may be less or more tax aggressive compared to U.S. firms. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, I hypothesize the interaction term of CA and DFIN (~3) to 
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be statistically significant to reflect that Canadian firms make the tradeoff decision 
differently from U.S. firms. 
In model 3, consistent with hypothesis 3, the sign of interaction of family/insider 
ownership and financial reporting aggressiveness is also not predicted (other than to be 
statistically significant) so as to remain agnostic about the comparative strengths of the 
different tradeoffs made by closely-held firms and widely-held firms. I predict tax 
aggressiveness is significantly associated with insider/family ownership, but the sign is 
not predicted. 
In model 4, the coefficient of the interaction of CA and IFO (~6) is predicted to be 
significant, but the sign is not predicted. Canadian firms with higher family and insider 
ownership may be more or less tax aggressive than other firms. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 3, ~7 (interaction of CA, IFO and DFIN) is expected to be statistically 
significant, but the sign is once again not predicted. Canadian closely-held firms may 
tradeoff differently between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness 
compared to other firms, but there is no a priori prediction whether it is more or less. 
Leverage and market-to-book ratio are proxies for financial reporting costs and are 
predicted to be negatively associated with tax aggressiveness. When pretax income is 
higher, firms may have incentives to be more tax aggressive since they may be less 
concerned about the corresponding reductions in book income (if any). Intangible assets 
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and foreign taxes are considered proxies for opportunities for tax planning based on the 
literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2010, Mills et al. 1998). However, such opportunities can be 
used to reduce tax payments or improve reported income (Mills et al. 1998). Tax loss 
carryforward and depreciation expenses are tax shields that can reduce tax burdens. 
Firms claiming large amounts of tax loss carryforwards or tax depreciation may not need 
to be as tax aggressive, and therefore such tax shields are hypothesized to be negatively 
associated with tax aggressiveness. Larger firms may face more financial pressure, and at 
the same time, may have more opportunities to reduce their tax burden. Therefore, I do 
not predict the sign of the coefficient on the size variable. The predictions for all other 
variables are the same as for the previous models. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics for the pooled sample are reported in Table 2.2. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics for dependent variables and Panel B reports descriptive statistics for 
continuous independent variables: insider and family ownership as continuous variables, 
assets, size, pretax ROA, market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio and intangible assets as a 
percentage of total assets. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for discrete independent 
variables: insider/family ownership, financial reporting costs, foreign tax, and total loss 
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carryforwards. 
The mean (median) tax aggressiveness for Canadian firms is higher than the mean 
(median) of U.S. firms23 . The mean financial reporting aggressiveness for Canadian firms 
is higher than the median, while the median financial reporting aggressiveness for U.S. 
firms is higher than the mean, which suggests that the skewness of financial reporting 
aggressiveness is different in two countries. Canada has more firms that do not report as 
aggressively, while U.S. has relatively more firms that report more aggressively. 
The average U.S. firm is larger than the average Canadian firm, while the 
performance in terms of pretax ROA in higher for U.S. firms compared to Canadian 
firms.24 The mean (median) market to book ratio in U.S. firms is significantly higher 
than Canadian firms, which could indicate more growth opportunities in the U.S. or 
signal over-priced stocks in the U.S. The mean (median) leverage ratio is lower for U.S. 
firms compared to Canadian firms, suggesting that U.S. firms use more equity financing. 
The mean intangible assets is higher for U.S. firms. 
In the Canadian subsample, 26.11 % of the firms are classified as closely-held firms 
compared to 15.50% for the U.S. subsample. This is consistent with prior studies that 
23 This is not consistent with my regression result. Before controlling for other factors, such as size and 
performance, I found average DT AX for Canadian firms is larger. However, after controlling for other 
factors (e.g., size, performance), there is no significant DTX difference between Canadian firms and U.S. 
firms. 
24 Earnings-related measures of Canadian firms are computed using Canadian GAAP while those of U.S. 
firms are computed using U.S. GAAP. 
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document more ownership concentrated in Canadian firms (e.g., Ben-Amar and Andre 
2006; Morck et al. 2000; Amoaku-Adu and Smith 2001 ). In my North American sample, 
more U.S. firms face higher financial reporting costs compared to Canadian firms (62.12% 
vs. 48.22%), and this could explain the need for U.S. firms to be more aggressive in their 
financial reporting. More U.S. firms pay foreign taxes compared to Canadian firms 
(76.58% vs. 19.58%), reflecting the greater number of multinational corporations in U.S. 
More U.S. firms also have tax loss carryforward compared to Canadian firms (42.36% vs. 
39.02%). 
Table 2.3 reports the Pearson correlation among independent variables. The highest 
correlation is 32.3% between market to book ratio and pretax ROA, suggesting that 
multicollinearity among independent variables is not a major concern. 
4.2 Regression results for hypotheses 1-3 (Table 2.4) 
The regression results for hypotheses 1-3 based on North American firms are 
presented in Table 2.4. I do not include the Canadian indicator, ownership variable and 
interactions in model 1. Tax aggressiveness is positively and significantly associated with 
financial reporting aggressiveness, suggesting that North American firms do not make 
tradeoffs between taxes and book incomes, consistent with Frank et al. (2009). 
In model 2, after including the Canada indicator and its interaction with financial 
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reporting aggressiveness, the positive association between tax aggressiveness and 
financial reporting aggressiveness remains, thereby supporting hypothesis 1. There is no 
significant difference between the level of tax aggressiveness for U.S. and Canadian 
firms. The interaction of Canadian firms and financial reporting aggressiveness is 
negative and significant, reflecting greater tradeoffs by Canadian firms. In model 3, after 
the ownership and its interaction term with Canadian firms are introduced to the model 
and the interaction of Canadian indicator and financial reporting aggressiveness is 
dropped from the model, the significance of the association between tax aggressiveness 
and financial reporting aggressiveness disappears. Firms with higher insider and family 
ownership are significantly more tax aggressive compared to other firms. The interaction 
of insider and family ownership and the financial reporting aggressiveness is positive and 
significant, supporting hypothesis 3. The sum of coefficients of ownership and its 
interaction with financial reporting aggressiveness is positive and significant, 25 
suggesting firms with higher insider and family ownership do not tradeoff between tax 
savings and book income. 
My Model 4 includes insider/family ownership and the associated interaction terms 
with the Canadian indicator, family ownership and DFIN - in addition to all the other 
independent variables. Similar to results of models 1 and 2, the association between tax 
25 The P-value of the hypothesis that sum of the two coefficients is zero is< 0.001. 
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aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness is significant and positive, 
suggesting firms do not tradeoff in general. Consistent with hypothesis 2, the interaction 
of Canadian firms and financial reporting aggressiveness is negative and significant. In 
addition, the sum of the coefficients of DFIN and DFIN*CA remains negative and 
significant,26 suggesting that unlike U.S. firms, Canadian firms tradeoff between tax 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. The coefficient of CA *IFO is 
positive and significant, suggesting that closely-held firms in Canada are more tax 
aggressive than other firms. The coefficient of DFIN*CA *IFO is positive and significant, 
suggesting that closely-held firms in Canada make different trade-off than other firms. 
Hypothesis 3 is therefore partially supported by Canadian data. The sum of the 
coefficients of DFIN, DFIN*IFO, DFIN*CA and DFIN*CA *IFO is positive and 
significant, 27 suggesting that Canadian closely-held firms make no tradeoff between tax 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. The coefficients of insider and 
family ownership and its interaction with financial reporting aggressiveness are both 
insignificant. This may be caused by the different ownership effects on U.S. and 
Canadian firms, and the effect may cancel out each other. 
Tax aggressiveness is positively and significantly associated with Pretax ROA, 
consistent with my prediction that firms with higher earnings have more incentives to 
26 The p-value of the hypothesis that the sum of the two coefficients is zero is< 0.001. 
27 The p-value of the hypothesis that the sum of the four coefficients is zero is< 0.001. 
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pursue tax savings. Tax aggressiveness is negatively associated with intangible assets (as 
a proportion of total assets at the beginning of the year) suggesting that perhaps firms are 
using them as earnings management opportunities instead of tax planning opportunities. 
4.3 Robustness Tests 
For robustness, I use two additional cutoff points ( 5% and 10%) to measure 
insider/family ownership in addition to the continuous variable for testing hypotheses 1 
to 3 in the North American context, and the results are reported in Table 2.5. I code 
insider and/or family ownership as 1 if the aggregate percentage of shares owned by 
insiders and family is higher than 5% (10% ), and 0 otherwise. The regression results with 
continuous and 5% (10%) cutoff points are reported in the first and second (third) 
columns of Table 2.5. Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and results in table 2.4, tax 
aggressiveness is positively and significantly associated with financial reporting 
aggressiveness, suggesting that North American firms do not generally tradeoff. However, 
my results show that Canadian firms tradeoffto a greater extent compared to U.S. firms 
The coefficient of the interaction between Canadian indicator and financial reporting 
aggressiveness is negative and significant, thereby supporting hypothesis 2. Canadian 
firms with higher insider and family ownership tradeoff differently compared to other 
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firms (i.e., they do not seem to tradeofl). Hypothesis 3 is partially supported by Canadian 
data. The robustness tests results are consistent with my main test. 
4.4 Cross-listed Firms 
I separately test a subsample of Canadian firms that are also listed on a U.S. exchange. 
Cross-listed firms have to comply with financial reporting and regulatory regimes for 
both jurisdictions (Canada and the U.S.). I expect cross-listed firms to behave like U.S. 
firms in their tradeoffs - i.e., I expect them to not exhibit tradeoff between tax reporting 
and financial reporting - due to pressures to compete with financial reporting by other 
U.S. firms. Upon introducing an ownership variable, I find that cross-listed firms with 
higher insider and/or family ownership do not tradeoff, similar to U.S. firms. These 
results are reported in table 2.6. 
5. Conclusion 
This study is motivated by the debate on whether firms tradeoff between book 
income and tax savings, and whether such tradeoffs are similar in Canada and the U.S. 
Furthermore, I test whether the tradeoffs are similar or different in closely-held firms and 
widely-held firms. This study addresses three research questions. First, I re-examine 
whether firms trade-off between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting 
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aggressiveness. Second, I examine whether Canadian firms tradeoff differently between 
tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness compared to U.S. 
firms. Finally, I examine whether closely-held firms tradeoff differently between tax 
reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. 
I find that tax reporting aggressiveness is positively associated with financial 
reporting aggressiveness for the S&P 500 firms in the U.S. and negatively associated for 
the TSX 300 firms in Canada for the period 2005 to 2008. The result suggests U.S. firms 
do not seem to tradeoff between book income and tax savings, while Canadian firms do 
tradeoff between the two goods. 
Furthermore, U.S. closely-held firms do not tradeoff significantly differently from 
widely-held firms. In contrast, Canadian closely-held firms tradeoff differently than other 
firms. The different role of ownership in the tradeoff decision in U.S. and Canadian firms 
may be explained in part by the favorable tax treatment of interoperate dividends in 
Canada, allowing better access to retain ownership concentration. This study helps in 
explaining the conflicting results in the literature by suggesting jurisdictional differences 
in tradeoff behavior. 
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Table 2.1: Sample Selection 
Initial Sample (firm-year observations) 
Deletions due to missing data for 
Insider/Family Ownership in Bloomberg 
Tax aggressiveness data in Compustat 
Financial Reporting Aggressiveness in Compustat 
Market-to-Book ratio in Compustat 
Leverage in Compustat 
Sample used in regressions 
(a) S & P 500 firms for 2005-2008 
(b) TSX 300 firms for 2005-2008 
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U.S. Samples Canadian Samples 
2000 (a) 1200(b) 
-74 -269 
-188 -121 
-197 -7 
-81 -127 
-8 -2 
1,452 674 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
U.S. Samples Canadian Sam pies 
Std Std 
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Dev Dev 
DTAX 1452 0.000 0.002 0.07 674 0.006 0.005 0.121 
DFIN 1452 0.001 0.007 0.046 674 0.005 0.001 0.13 
Panel B: Continuous Variables 
U.S. Samples Canadian Samples 
Std Std Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Dev Dev 
IFO 1452 2.683 0.723 6.045 674 8.025 1.371 12.666 
ASSETS 1452 23,406 9,770 55,958 674 18,018 2,467 61,695 
SIZE 1452 9.251 9.187 1.199 674 8.133 7.793 1.465 
PTROA 1452 0.126 0.119 0.106 674 0.117 0.100 0.104 
MTB 1452 3.765 2.957 3.345 674 2.182 1.872 1.579 
LEV 1452 0.675 0.400 1.173 674 0.759 0.446 1.108 
INT ANG 1452 0.247 0.038 0.251 674 0.167 0.054 0.286 
Panel C: Discrete variables 
U.S. Samples Canadian Samples 
Percen Percen 
Variable N N 
t t 
IFO 1 225 15.50% 1 176 26.11% 
FRC 1 902 62.12% 1 325 48.22% 
FORT AX 1 1112 76.58% 1 132 19.58% 
TLCF 1 615 42.36% 1 252 39.02% 
Variable definitions 
Dependent variables: 
DT AX or Tax Aggressiveness = the proxy for tax aggressiveness based on Frank et al. (2009); 
DFIN or Financial Reporting Aggressiveness= the proxy for financial reporting aggressiveness 
calculated following Frank et al. (2009) ; 
Independent variables: 
SIZE = Size = natural log of total assets; 
PTROA = Pretax ROA calculated as the pretax income for firm i in year t divided by total 
assets for firm i in year t-1 ; 
MTB = Market to book ratio calculated as the market value of common equity divided by book 
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value of common equity at end of current year; 
LEV = Leverage calculated as long-term debt at current year-end divided by book value of 
equity at current year-end; 
INTANG =Intangible Assets (as% of total assets t-D calculated as intangible assets for firm i 
in year t divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
Discrete variables: 
IFO =Insider/Family Ownership= an indicator variable that equals 1 ifthe firm's family and 
insider ownership is above the sample average family and insider ownership, and 0 otherwise; 
FRC = Financial Reporting Cost coded as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm's ROA is below target ROA; target ROA is calculated following Klassen and Mawani 
(2000) as follows: Target ROAt = {(l +driftt) (Nlt-1 I BVt-2)}, where driftt = (1 /2)Target ROAt-1 
+ ( 1I4 )Target RO At- 2 + (1I8)Target ROAt-3 + ( 1Il6)Target ROAt-4 + ( 1Il6)Target ROAt-s; 
TLCF =Tax Loss Carryforward proxied as an indicator variable that equals 1 iftax loss 
carryforward is positive, and 0 otherwise; and 
FORT AX =Foreign Tax proxied by an indicator variable that equals 1 if foreign tax expenses 
are positive, and 0 otherwise; and 
CA = Canadian firm indicator = takes value of 1 if the firm is a Canadian-based firm and takes 
value ofO ifthe firm is a U.S.-based firm. 
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Table 2.3: Pearson Correlation 
DFIN IFO FRC FORT AX TLCF MTB LEV PTROA INT ANG 
IFO -0.060 1.000 
(0.005) 
FRC 0.015 -0.052 1.000 
(0.477) (0.016) 
FORT AX -0.011 -0.085 0.101 1.000 
(0.598) (0.000) (0.000) 
TLCF -0.085 -0.045 0.006 0.175 1.000 
(0.000) (0.036) (0.771) (0.000) 
MTB 0.003 -0.002 0.084 0.221 0.000 1.000 
(0.907) (0.938) (0.000) (0.000) (0.992) 
LEV -0.021 -0.001 -0.031 -0.146 0.039 0.279 1.000 
(0.339) (0.952) (0.157) (0.000) (0.074) (0.000) 
PTROA 0.246 -0.001 0.111 0.127 -0.093 0.323 -0.241 1.000 
(0.000) (0.963) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INT ANG -0.028 0.028 -0.062 0.178 0.141 -0.016 -0.007 -0.016 1.000 
(0.201) (0.204) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.460) (0.743) (0.456) 
SIZE 0.026 -0.214 -0.027 0.237 -0.038 -0.062 0.073 -0.180 0.023 
(0.224) (0.000) (0.207) (0.000) (0.084) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.281) 
Note: 
This table presents Pearson Correlation among variables. The variables are defined in Table 2.2. P-Values are presented 
in parentheses. 
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Table 2.4: Association between Tax Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting 
Aggressiveness for North American firms 
DTAXit =Po+ P1 DFINit + P2 CAit +p3 DFINit * CAit +p4 IFOit+ Ps DFINit* IFOit+P6 CAit 
* IFOit +P1 DFINit * IFOit * CAit + Ps FRCit + p9 MTBit + P10 LEVit + P11 PTROAit + P12 
FORT AXit + Pn INT AN Git+ P14 TLCFit +Pis SIZEit + Eit 
Dependent variable 
DTAX Pred Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Intercept -0.022* -0.018 -0.023 -0.017 
(0~086) (0.228) (0.114) (0.234) 
DFIN (HI)? 0.035* 0.139*** -0.013 0.143*** 
(0.080) (0.000) (0.533) (0.000) 
CA ? 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.938) (0.763) (0.953) 
DFIN*CA (H2)? -0.169*** -0.268*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
IFO ? 0.007* 0.001 
(0.099) (0.905) 
DFIN*IFO (H3)? 0.349*** -0.047 
(0.000) (0.599) 
CA*IFO ? 0.015* 
(0.090) 
CA *DFIN*IFO ? 0.659*** 
(0.000) 
FRC -0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 
(0.885) (0.314) (0.982) (0.405) 
MTB -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.217) (0.498) (0.195) (0.425) 
LEV 0.003 0.002 0.003* 0.002 
(0.101) (0.239) (0.095) (0.253) 
PTROA + 0.182*** 0.163*** 0.178*** 0.162*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FORT AX ? -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.503) (0.499) (0.733) (0.779) 
INT ANG ? -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.052··· -0.049*** 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TLCF - 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.513) (0.612) (0.558) (0.607) 
SIZE ? 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
(0.219) (0.266) (0.233) (0.319) 
Adj. R2 0.075 0.092 0.093 0.114 
No. of observations 2126 2126 2126 2126 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 using a pooled ordinary 
least squares estimation. There are 2126 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 
2008. The dependent measures and independent variables are defined in Table 2.2. 
P-Values are presented in parentheses. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Table 2.5: Association between tax aggressiveness and different measures of 
insider/family ownership 
DT AX it = Po+ Pi DFINit + P2 CAit +p3 DFINit * CAit +p4 IFOit + Ps DFINit * IFOit +p6 CAit 
* IFOit +P1 DFINit * IFOit * CAit + Ps Year 2006 * DFINit + p9 Year 2007 * DFINit + P10 
Year 2008 * DFINit + Pi i FRCit + P12 MTBit + Pn LEVit + Pi4 PTROAit +Pis FORT AXit 
+ Pi6INTANGit+ P11 TLCFit +Pis DEPit + Pi9 SIZEit + P20-22 Year+ Eit 
Dependent variable IFO IFO Cutoff Point 
DTAX Pred Continuous Insides Inside IO Variable 
Intercept -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 
(0.230) (0.239) (0.262) 
DFIN (HI)? 0.138 ... 0.144 ... o.138··· 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IFO ? 0.000 0.002 0.001 
(0.666) (0.749) (0.875) 
DFIN*IFO (H2)? 0.000 -0.070 0.009 
(0.983) (0.500) (0.946) 
CA ? -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(0.871) (0.899) (0.835) 
CA*DFIN (H3)? -0.266 ... -0.268··· -0.234 ... 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CA*IFO ? 0.000 0.015 0.020· 
(0.273) (0.131) (0.091) 
CA *DFIN*IFO ? 0.019 ... 0.697 ... 0.568 ... 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
FRC - -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.366) (0.373) (0.337) 
MTB - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.424) (0.418) (0.389) 
LEV - 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.231) (0.213) (0.238) 
PTROA + 0.161 ••• 0.161 ••• 0.161 ... 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FORTAX ? -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.723) (0.778) (0.673) 
INTANG ? -0.051 ••• -0.049••• -0.051 ... 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TLCF - 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.572) (0.636) (0.608) 
SIZE ? 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.297) (0.326) (0.299) 
Adj. R2 0.107 0.115 0.105 
No. of observations 2126 2126 2126 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 using a 
pooled ordinary least squares estimation. There are 2126 firm-year 
observations over the period 2005 to 2008. The dependent measures and 
independent variables are defined in Table 2.2. P-Values are presented in 
parentheses. 
* * * Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Table 2.6: Association between Tax Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting 
Aggressiveness for Canadian cross-listed firms 
DTAXit =Po+ P1 DFINit + P2 IFOit + p3 DFINit*IFOit + p4 FRCit + Ps MTBit + P6 LEVit + 
P1PTROAit + PsFORTAXit + p9INTANGit+ P10 TLCFit + P11 SIZEit + P12-14 Year+ Eit 
Dependent variable 
DTAX Pred Column 1 Column 2 
Intercept 0.028 0.032 
(0.478) (0.420) 
DFIN (HI)? •• 0.087 0.121 
(0.034) (0.155) 
IFO 0.001 
(0.964) 
DFIN*IFO (H3)? • 0.281 
(0.090) 
FRC - -0.003 -0.003 
(0.825) (0.840) 
MTB - 0.007 0.006 
(0.108) (0.184) 
LEV 
-
0.007 0.007 
(0.185) (0.200) 
PTROA ••• 
... 
+ 0.212 0.211 
(0.002) (0.003) 
FORT AX ? -0.003 -0.002 
(0.841) (0.910) 
INT ANG ? ••• 
. .. 
-0.126 -0.115 
(0.000) (0.000) 
TLCF - 0.004 0.004 
(0.738) (0.758) 
SIZE ? -0.006 -0.006 
(0.163) (0.146) 
Adj. R2 0.103 0.106 
No. of observations 340 340 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of hypotheses 1, and 3 using a pooled ordinary 
least squares estimation. There are 340 firm-year observations over the period 2005 to 
2008. The dependent measures and independent variables are defined in Table 2.2. 
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P-Values are presented in parentheses. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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ESSAY3 
IFRS Adoption and Executive 
Compensation: Preliminary Canadian 
Evidence 
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1. Introduction 
Effective January 1, 2011, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
became the mandatory reporting standards for publicly accountable enterprises28 and 
government business entities in Canada. IFRS was mandated to improve the 
comparability of financial statements across firms in different jurisdictions as well as 
enhance stewardship evaluation within a firm. In their study of Continental European 
firms adopting IFRS, Wu and Zhang (2011) document greater financial reporting 
comparability associated with IFRS adoption as well as a stronger stewardship 
assessment role played by IFRS earnings. 
IFRS was arguably designed to be more effective at stewardship evaluation, and 
therefore as a result, firms may have good reasons to rely more on accounting 
performance measures to evaluate executives (Ozkan et al, 2012; Wu and Zhang 2011). I 
therefore hypothesize that pay for accounting-based performance will be stronger after 
IFRS adoption as the reported accounting measures become more reliable and 
comparable under IFRS. While Ozkan et al (2012) and Wu and Zhang (2011) have 
examined this topic in the European context, this study is - to the best of my knowledge 
- the first one to examine this issue in the Canadian context. Unlike other studies in this 
literature, the Canadian data allows me to examine all individual components of 
28 Some firms or industries are allowed to defer the adoption of IFRS, such as investment and mining 
firms. 
84 
compensation: cash, bonus, total cash, equity and total compensation. Other studies using 
European data examine focus mostly on cash compensation because large variations in 
stock market returns within different European countries (e.g. Ozkan et al, 2012) made 
them inappropriate for comparison over time. This study is also the first one to examine 
the change in pay-for-accounting-performance sensitivity as Canadian firms moved from 
the old Canadian GAAP to IFRS. 
It will take some time to assess whether IFRS has resulted in enhanced comparability 
and improved stewardship evaluation in the Canadian context (e.g., Ozkan et al 2012). 
However, the cost of adopting IFRS is starting to surface. Firms incurred a steep learning 
curve in adopting IFRS that resulted in additional staff, consulting and senior 
management time and energy. The incremental "mind and management" responsibility 
for IFRS adoption - including meeting all statutory reporting requirements - was 
typically assigned to CFOs. Such greater responsibilities are typically associated with 
higher compensation in a competitive labour market (e.g., Balsam et al 2012). While 
CEOs were also faced with greater responsibilities, it is not clear whether they earned 
higher IFRS-induced compensation. Depending on what else was going on in the firm, it 
is conceivable that the CFOs compensation relative to the CEOs' compensation increased 
in the year of IFRS adoption. 
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CEO compensation is found to be associated with firm size, firm performance (both 
accounting and market), risks, corporate governance and other variables. CFO 
compensation is also found to be associated with the same factors (Smith 1995). 
Compensation in general is awarded for (1) meeting certain goals or milestones (e.g., 
adopting IFRS); (2) moving ahead on certain goals for which directional incentives may 
be offered (e.g., cost reduction or earnings growth); and (3) taking risks. This paper 
focuses on the first role described above at the senior executive level. 
There is limited research examining the relative compensation for CFOs and CEOs, 
and whether they are both driven by the same factors. The executive compensation 
literature largely focuses on the association between compensation and financial 
performance measures, even though non-financial measures are used by boards to assess 
and reward senior management. The adoption of IFRS by Canadian firms in 2011 offers 
an opportunity to evaluate whether the chief financial officers (CFOs) were compensated 
for taking on the additional fiduciary duties of ensuring IFRS was appropriately adopted 
in time. This line of research follows Hoitash et al (2012) who examine whether CFOs 
earned more for disclosing internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) legislated under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Similar to the adoption of SOX in 2002, IFRS adoption 
is a non-financial performance measure that requires firms to meet specific reporting 
targets. As a non-financial performance measure, implementing IFRS would impact the 
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responsibility and management workload of a CFO much more than that of a CEO, and 
therefore could affect the CFO's compensation relative to the CEO's compensation. 
During the adoption of IFRS, it was generally expected that CFO was the senior 
executive who planned, performed and managed the adoption, including establishing new 
accounting policies, modifying the accounting operations, negotiating with auditors, 
documenting the changes and ensuring that all statutory requirements were met on time. 
It is reasonable to predict CF Os compensation relative to CEOs' compensation increased 
in the year that IFRS was adopted. 
This study investigates the association between executive compensation and the 
IFRS adoption. I ask three questions. First, whether accounting-based pay for 
performance sensitivity is stronger after IFRS adoption. Second, whether executive 
compensation is positively associated with IFRS adoption. Third, whether CFO 
compensation relative to CEO compensation is positively associated with IFRS adoption. 
To answer these three questions, I start with a sample of the largest 400 firms listed 
on Toronto Stock exchange with December 31 year-ends29• I examine whether 
accounting-based pay-for-performance sensitively is stronger after IFRS adoption. I find 
that the change in total compensation is positively and significantly associated with the 
interaction term of IFRS adoption and change in earnings per share (EPS). A one 
29 I started data collection in April, 2012, by then only firms with year-end of December 31 had disclosed 
their IFRS reports. 
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standard deviation increase in L\EPS (1.30) after IFRS adoption in adoption firms 
increased executive compensation by $0.174 million on average. I also find that 
executives earned $11.3 7 more for every $1,000 increase of accounting income under 
IFRS than under previous Canadian GAAP. 
I then test the association between absolute levels of executive compensation with 
IFRS adoption. CFO salary, bonus, cash compensation and total compensation are found 
to be positively associated with IFRS adoption. CFO cash compensation and total 
compensation increase by $54,751 and $108,624 respectively upon IFRS adoption after 
controlling for CFO tenure, firm size, earnings per share, stock return, book-to-market 
ratio, firm return volatility, and industry. This association between CFO compensation 
and IFRS adoption is also economically significant. In contrast, levels of CEO 
compensation were not found to be significantly associated with IFRS adoption. 
Finally, I examine the association between CFO compensation relative to CEO 
compensation and IFRS adoption. The association is positive and significant for bonus. 
CFO bonus relative to CEO bonus increases by 24%30 in the year ofIFRS adoption after 
controlling for tenure of CEO and CFO. This result shows that the CFO is compensated 
more relative to the CEO during IFRS adoption, and the incremental compensation is 
mainly in the form of bonus. 
30 Exp(0.218)-1=24% 
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I conduct robustness tests to examine whether my findings can be explained by other 
competing reasons. One reason for the positive association between relative CFO 
compensation and IFRS adoption could be the year effect, and an alternative explanation 
for the positive association between absolute CFO compensation and IFRS adoption 
could be both the year effect and the industry effect. I compare executive compensation 
levels of my sample of IFRS-adopting firms with Canadian non-adopters and U.S. firms, 
and find that neither of the alternative explanation is supported by the data. I conclude 
my robustness tests by claiming that the IFRS effect is not the same as year effect or 
industry effect. 
This study contributes to the IFRS adoption literature by adding preliminary 
evidence on the effect of accounting standard change on CFO compensation using 
Canadian data. The increased compensation constitutes additional regulatory costs 
imposed on shareholders. Although shareholders' likely benefit from the comparability of 
financial statements prepared by firms in different jurisdictions adopting the same IFRS, 
benefits net of costs may be limited in the early periods. My study also contributes to the 
relative compensation literature. Within the same firm, CFO bonus relative to CEO bonus 
is significantly associated with IFRS adoption, while I do not find any positive 
association between CEO compensation and IFRS adoption. I also find that absolute 
compensation and relative compensation are affected by different factors. This study also 
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contributes to the debate about whether IFRS earnings better reflect management's 
stewardship. I find that accounting-based pay-for-performance sensitivity is statistically 
stronger and economically higher in the year of adoption. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the literature 
and develops hypotheses, while section 3 describes the data and articulates my 
hypotheses more formally. Section 4 presents the results of my regression tests and 
robustness tests. The last section concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Is EPS more important for executive compensation after IFRS adoption? 
Research on European firms suggests that financial statements' comparability and 
earnings quality have improved since adoption ofIFRS. Yip and Young (2012) used three 
measures of comparability: ( 1) the similarity of accounting functions that translate 
economic events into accounting data; (2) the degree of information transfer; and (3) the 
similarity of the information content of earnings and of the book value of equity. They 
conclude that adoption of IFRS significantly improved the comparability of financial 
statements in 17 European countries. 
By studying firms' adoption of IAS31 in 21 countries, Barth et al (2008) find that 
31 IAS (International Accounting Standards) was issued by IA.SC, and IFRS was published by IASB, 
which succeeded the IASC. 
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firms generally reported less earnings management and more timely loss recognition, as 
well as produced more value relevant accounting numbers compared to a sample of 
matched firms applying non-U.S. domestic standards. Zeghal et al (2012)'s findings are 
consistent with Barth et al (2008) as they also find that adoption of IFRS is associated 
with less earnings management and improved timeliness. 
Board compensation committees in Canada could incorporate such research findings 
and consider IFRS as a higher quality accounting standard that can better reflect firm 
performance. As a result, boards could rely more on the new IFRS accounting numbers to 
assess stewardship of their senior managers and to base executive compensation 
decisions on such numbers. 
Ozkan et al (2012) examine whether compensation contracts were increasingly based 
on accounting numbers after adoption of IFRS in Europe. They hypothesize that firms 
increasingly use accounting numbers for executive compensation after the adoption of 
IFRS, as well as relied more on foreign peers from IFRS jurisdictions to determine 
compensation of their own executives. Based on a sample of 892 public companies from 
15 European countries for the period of 2002-2008, they find results that support their 
hypotheses. They conclude that "the overall results are consistent with the compensation 
committees in those countries perceiving earnings after IFRS adoption to be of higher 
quality and comparability." (Ozkan et al 2012, page 1077) 
91 
Based on the literature, my first hypothesis (in alternate form) is as follows. 
HJ: Boards rely more on accounting numbers after IFRS adoption/or their executive 
compensation decisions. 
2.2 Is pay-for-accounting-performance sensitivity higher after IFRS adoption? 
Executive compensation is often used to align incentives between managers and 
shareholders and to mitigate agency costs. (e.g., Scott 2006). 
If IFRS reflects firm and managerial performance more accurately (Ozkan et al 2012), 
it is conceivable that firms will use greater pay-for-performance compensation contracts 
for their senior executives. In other words, firms could increase incentive-based 
compensation after IFRS adoption. In addition, when the accounting performance 
measures seem more reliable (e.g., Barth et al 2008, Zeghal et al 2012), compensation 
committees will be willing to pay (or incent) more for the reliable performance. 
Pay-performance sensitivity is defined by Murphy and Jensen (1990) as "the dollar 
change in the CEO's wealth associated with a dollar change in the wealth of 
shareholders." In my study, I define pay-performance sensitivity as the dollar change in 
the CEO's total compensation associated with $1,000 dollar change in firm's accounting 
net income. 
My second hypothesis (in alternate form) is as follows: 
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H2: Pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher in the year of IFRS adoption (year 
2011) compared to pre-adoption. 
2.3 Are CFOs and CEOs compensated for IFRS adoption? 
Balsam et al (2012) predict and find that executive compensation (for both CEO and 
CFO) is higher after IFRS adoption. Prior studies have found that executives are 
rewarded for large one-time corporate events. For example, Harford and Li (2007) find 
CEOs are compensated for merger and acquisition even if the bidding shareholders are 
subsequently worse off due to the transaction. IFRS transition was a large event for 
Canadian firms in 2011, and required significant incremental effort from senior 
management. For example, firms had to restate their 2010 fiscal year financial statements 
from old Canadian GAAP to IFRS in order to present two years of comparable data when 
they started presenting their 2011 fiscal year financial statements under IFRS. This 
amounts to almost double the accounting work load during the year of adoption. 
Senior management also had to learn the differences between IFRS and the old 
Canadian GAAP in order to choose accounting policies that were most appropriate for 
their firms. The "heavier reliance of IFRS on fair value accounting and comprehensive 
income, and the use of the entity theory for consolidation" (Blanchette et al 2012) 
required Canadian executives to report using a different set of measurement. IFRS also 
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introduced the need for annual impairment testing of property, plant & equipment, 
goodwill and intangible assets. This increased both the volume and the complexity of 
executives' work load. My third hypotheses (in alternate forms) are as follows: 
H3a: CFO compensation is higher in the year of IFRS adoption (year 2011) compared to 
pre-adoption. 
H3b: CEO compensation is higher in the year of IFRS adoption (year 2011) compared to 
pre-adoption. 
2.4 Are CFOs compensated more relative to CEOs compensation for IFRS adoption? 
Balsam et al (2012) examine the reasons for and the magnitude of the impact of 
IFRS adoption on CFO compensation. In their sample of 13,214 firm-years from 23 
countries for the period of 2000-2007, they find that CFO compensation increases more 
than CEO compensation during the years in which IFRS is adopted, arguably because 
CFOs are mainly responsible for the financial reporting function within firms. They also 
find that the increase in CFO compensation is not temporary; CFOs were found to earn 
the IFRS premium for the entire post-adoption period in their sample (from 2005 to 
2007). 
Loyeung et al (2011) study the association between CFO compensation and their 
"accounting talent." They define "accounting talent" as the inverse of the errors made by 
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firms after the adoption. They examine 280 Australian firms before and after the 
transition to IFRS and find a positive association between the CFO compensation and 
CFO talent during the transition year, and a positive association between CFO bonus and 
CFO talent in the IFRS adoption year. They also find a negative association between the 
CFO turnover and their talent. The two studies document evidence that CFO 
compensation is significantly associated with IFRS adoption. 
The fourth research question in this study examines whether CFOs are awarded more 
compensation relative to CEOs after the transition to IFRS, arguably because of the 
greater workload, greater complexity and/or greater risk. While it may not be necessary 
for CEOs to understand the difference between Canadian GAAP and IFRS, it is essential 
for CF Os to understand the differences and guide the allocation of resources required to 
implement the change, as well as the potential reputational and other costs if the changes 
are not implemented in time to meet the statutory reporting deadlines. This leads to my 
fourth hypothesis (in alternate form): 
H4: CFO compensation is higher relative to CEO compensation in the year of IFRS 
(year 2011) adoption compared to pre-adoption. 
3. Data and regression model design 
3.1 Data 
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My sample consists of the 400 largest Canadian firms listed on Toronto Stock 
Exchange or Toronto Stock Exchange Venture with December 31st year-ends. Detailed 
components of compensation for both the CEO and CFO are manually collected from 
Sedar.com for the years 2009-11. The compensation data collected include salary, annual 
incentive plan (or bonus), equity-based compensation, pension compensation and total 
compensation. Cash compensation is the sum of salary and annual incentive plan (bonus). 
Equity compensation is the sum of share-based compensation and option-based 
compensation. All other accounting and market data are retrieved from Compustat. All 
continuous variables are winsorized by 1 % both at the top and bottom. 
Table 3 .1 describes the data selection procedure and explains the sample sizes used in 
the subsequent regression analysis. I exclude 36 firms from my sample that did not adopt 
IFRS in 2011, presumably because they were allowed to defer IFRS adoption. I also 
exclude 11 observations in which either the CEO or the CFO received zero total 
compensation. Finally, 502 firm-year observations were deleted from the sample because 
of missing data in Sedar and I or Compustat. 
Table 3.2 presents the statistical description of my data. Panel A shows the CEO and 
CFO compensation for both pre-adoption and for the year of IFRS adoption. CF Os' 
average compensation increased from $925,000 to $958,000 in the year of IFRS adoption, 
while the mean CEO compensation decreased from $2,325,000 to $2,213,000 during the 
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same year. Panels 2 and 3 describe continuous variables and discrete variables, 
respectively. The minimum values for size, book to market ratios, and volatility are 
rounded to zero. A firm's industry is coded using the two-digits SIC. Table 3.2 also 
defines all my variables used in the study. 
3.2 Regression Model for Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 examines the role of accounting numbers in executive compensation 
contracts. Similar to Ozkan et al (2012), I use change in compensation instead of level of 
compensation as my dependent variable to control for sticky wages and firm 
characteristics. The following regression equation is used to test hypothesis 3: 
fl. Compensation = Po+P1 Year ofIFRS Adoption*D..EPS + P2 Year ofIFRS Adoption 
(+) 
+ P3D..(EPS) + p4 CFO _Indicator+ Ps D..(Stock Return)+ P6D.. (Firm Size)+ P1 D..(Firm 
Return Volatility)+ Ps D..(Book to Market) (model 1) 
I expect a positive p1, indicating changes in executive compensation are positively 
associated with IFRS _Adoption * D..EPS. 
3 .3 Regression Model for Hypothesis 2 
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In hypothesis 2, I examine whether the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) is 
higher in the year of IFRS adoption than in years prior to adoption. I hypothesize that the 
coefficient on Year of IFRS-adoption is positive and significant to reflect the stronger 
reliance on IFRS accounting numbers by compensation committees of the boards. I 
define the dependent variable PPS as the ratio of change in total compensation over the 
change in accounting net income. Following Jensen and Murphy (1990), I do not include 
other control variables except an indicator variable of CFO. 
~(Total compensation)/ ~(Net Income) = Po+ P1 Year of IFRS _Adoption 
(+) 
+P2 CFO _indicator 
3.4 Regression Model for Hypothesis 3 
(model 2) 
Hypothesis 3 tests whether CFOs and CEOs earned higher absolute compensation 
in the year of IFRS adoption. I use the level of compensation as dependent variable and 
control for both personal-level and firm-level characteristics. 
CFO (CEO) Compensation= Po+ P1 Year of IFRS _Adoption+ P2 CFO (CEO)_ Tenure 
(+) 
+p3 EPS + P4 Stock Return+ Ps Firm Size+ P6 Firm Return Volatility+ P1 Book to 
Market+ p Industry Indicators (model 3) 
My choice of control variables is based on those used in this literature (e.g., Balsam 
et al 2012). Firm size is defined as the natural log of market value and to avoid log of 
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zero, I add 1 to all market values. The definitions for other variables can be found in 
Table 3.2. 
3.5 Regression Model for Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 examines whether CFO earn relatively higher compensation compared 
to CEOs within the same firms during the year of IFRS adoption. I use the following 
model to test hypothesis 4: 
(CFO Compensation/CEO Compensation)= Po+ P1 Year of IFRS _adoption 
(+) 
+P2 Relative_ Tenure (model 4) 
Given the skewness of the relative compensation variables, I take the natural log of 
CFO compensation over CEO compensation as the dependent variable, and to avoid the 
natural log of zero, I add 0.1 % to the ratio of CFO compensation over CEO 
compensation. If any component of compensation - for example, equity compensation -
is zero for the same firm's CEO and CFO in the same year, I define the ratio to be zero. 
Relative tenure is introduced in this model since relative executive compensation 
may reflect the relative seniority of the executive. Relative_ Tenure is coded as an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the CFO has been in the CFO position 
longer than the CEO has been in the CEO position and 0 otherwise. Since the CEO and 
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CFO are from the same firm, all the firm-level features are exactly the same for both 
executives. As a result, I do not introduce any additional firm-level control variables. 
4. Regression results 
4.1 Hypothesis 1 
Results of regression model 1 are presented in table 3.3. The change in total 
compensation is positively associated with the interaction term of change in EPS and the 
year of IFRS adoption at conventional levels, thereby supporting hypothesis 1. Prior to 
IFRS adoption, change in EPS is not statistically significant suggesting that it was not as 
instrumental in being the base for compensation contracts for Canadian executives. 
Ozkan et al (2012) find similar results. The sum of the two coefficients (~EPS*IFRS and 
~PS) is 174.182, which suggests that total compensation increased by approximately 
$174,000 for every one standard deviation increase in ~EPS (1.30) in the year of IFRS 
adoption. 
Following Ozkan et al (2012), I also examine whether change in executive 
compensation is associated with the interaction term of change in stock return and the 
year of IFRS adoption. I do not make any predictions for this coefficient since I know of 
no reason why stock return would be a stronger base for executive compensation after 
IFRS adoption. Consistent with Ozkan et al (2012), I find no significant association 
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between change in compensation and the interaction of change in stock return and IFRS 
adoption. After controlling for this interaction term, the association between change in 
compensation and the interaction term of change in EPS and year of IFRS adoption 
remain positive and statistically significant, consistent with Ozkan et al (2012). 
As predicted, change in total compensation is negatively associated with the change 
of book to market ratio. While the compensation level is positively associated with the 
book to market ratio (tables 3.5 and 3.6), the change in compensation is negative and 
significantly associated with the book to market ratio. This may be due to the lower 
correlation among independent variables in the change model. Change in total 
compensation is also positively associated with change in firm size at conventional levels. 
Firm size could be a proxy for complexity as well as volume of work (Balsam et al 2011 ). 
The Year of IFRS adoption indicator variable is negative and significant, consistent with 
both Balsam et al (2012) and Ozkan et al (2012)32• 
4.2 Hypothesis 2 
Results of regression model 2 are presented in table 3.4. The coefficient for the year 
of IFRS-adoption variable is positive and significant. In the year of IFRS adoption, CEOs 
32 Balsam et al (2012) and Ozkan et al (2012) define the year of transition and post-transition as "post" 
dummy variable in their studies, and the coefficients of post dummy variable are negative and significant in 
these two studies. 
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and CFOs earned $11.37 more for every $1,000 increase in accounting net income, 
thereby supporting hypothesis 2. The coefficient for the CFO indicator variable is not 
significant, suggesting that there is no significant difference between CEO compensation 
and CFO compensation due to changes in accounting net income. 
I also conduct at-test to test the hypothesis that the mean of PPS in year of IFRS 
adoption is smaller than the mean of PPS in pre-adoption year. I get a p-value of 0.0479 
(untabulated), indicating that I are 95% certain that the mean of PPS in adoption year is 
higher compared to the pre-adoption year. 
4.3 Hypothesis 3a and 3b 
I present the regression results of hypotheses 3a and 3b in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 
respectively. Table 3.5 shows that CFO salary, bonus, cash compensation and total 
compensation are all higher in the year of IFRS adoption, thereby supporting hypothesis 
3a. After controlling for CFO tenure, earnings per share, stock return, firm return 
volatility, book-to-market ratio and industries, CFOs earned $54,751 more in cash 
compensation and $108,624 more in total compensation during the year ofIFRS 
adoption. It seems that CFOs earned approximately double the salary and bonus, 
presumable because they had to prepare two sets of financial statements for comparative 
purposes (i.e., 2010 year-end financial statements had to be prepared under the old 
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Canadian GAAP and then again under IFRS). Table 3.6 shows that CEO compensation is 
not significantly associated with IFRS adoption, thereby not supporting hypothesis 3b. 
My results for the control variable are generally consistent with the literature. Tables 
3 .5 and 3 .6 show that executive compensation is positively and significantly associated 
with tenure for both CFOs and CEOs, consistent with Balsam et al (2012). CFO bonus 
and cash compensation are positively associated with EPS33, while CEO salary, bonus, 
cash and total compensation are positively associated with EPS. Stock return is not 
significant for CFO compensation, but significant for CEO salary and cash 
compensation34• Size is significant for every component of compensation, also consistent 
• 
with Balsam et al (2012). CEO salary is negatively associated with firm return volatility. 
CEOs are expected to demand higher risk premiums when risk - as measured by the 
standard deviation of past five-year stock return - is higher. This could explain the 
negative association between CEO salary and risk. I do not find significant association 
between firm return volatility and CFO compensation. Similar to the stock return, this 
may be because CFOs are not responsible for stock price performance. Book to market 
ratio is significant for some components of CEO and CFO compensation, but the 
association is positive - contrary to expectation. Balsam et al. (2012) also find this 
33 Balsam et al (2012) use ROA instead ofEPS as proxy ofaccounting performance, and they find positive 
association for the bonus component only. 
34 Balsam et al (2012) find CFO bonus is positively associated with stock return, while salary and total 
cash compensation is negatively associated with stock return. 
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positive association between compensation and book-to-market ratio. The reason could 
be the strong correlation between size and book to market ratio. 
4.4 Hypothesis 4 
Results of regression model 4 are presented in table 3.7. As predicted, the coefficient 
on bonus is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that CFO earned a relatively 
higher bonus than CEOs in the year of IFRS adoption after controlling for relative tenure. 
The result is generally consistent with Balsam (2012). 35 CF Os earned a bonus that was 
24.36 percent36 higher relative to CEOs' bonus in the year of IFRS adoption. If I drop 
tenure as a control variable and conduct a univariate test, my regression results show 
CFOs earn almost 35 percent more compensation relative to CEOs in the year of IFRS 
adoption. 
Relative_Tenure is coded as 1 ifthe CFO's tenure is greater than the CEO's tenure 
in the same firm for this year and 0 otherwise. I do not predict the sign of relative tenure 
since equity compensation could be positively or negatively associated with tenure. In 
general, compensation tends to increase with tenure, especially the salary component. 
Many firms increase nominal salaries at the level of inflation and to reflect some 
seniority. However, when firms hire new executives (i.e., with no tenure history), they 
35 Balsam et al (2012) find CFOs are paid more in salary, bonus and cash compensation. 
36 Exp(0.218)-1=24.36% 
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often need to compensate the new executive at the previous incumbent's compensation 
package just before they departed, especially since such information is publicly disclosed. 
Equity compensation often constitutes a large component of total compensation package 
for new executive so as to align them to the long-term interest of the firm. My results 
show that CFO's salary and cash compensation relative to CEOs' salary and cash 
compensation is positively associated with the CF Os' relative tenure. 
4.5 Alternative explanation for absolute CFO compensation levels 
An alternative explanation for the positive association between levels of CFO 
compensation and the year of IFRS _adoption (year 2011) could be that the IFRS effect is 
the same as year effect - i.e., perhaps the economy was better in 2011 compared to 2010, 
and increases in CFO compensation could reflect this time trend instead of adoption of 
IFRS. If this argument holds, I should find the positive association between CFO 
compensation and year 2011 for non-adopting Canadian firms and for U.S. firms who did 
not adopt IFRS. The regression results using model 3 reported in panel A of table 3.8 
show that the coefficients for year 2011 are not significant, which suggest that there is no 
significant change in total executive compensation after controlling for firm 
characteristics. I also conduct t-test using the two respective samples with results 
reported in panel A. The t-statistic is too low for me to reject the hypothesis that the 
105 
compensation in year 2011 and year 2010 are statistically similar. In other words, I fail to 
find the positive association between total compensation and year 2011 by testing 
Canadian non-adopting firms and U.S. firms. In an untabulated Chow-test, I compare my 
sample of IFRS adopting firms with Canadian non-adopters and U.S. firms using model 
3. The p-value is< 0.001 from the Chow-test, suggesting that the coefficients of the two 
samples are significantly different. In summary, none of the three tests results support the 
year effect argument. 
An alternative explanation for the positive association between CFO compensation 
and the year of IFRS-adoption (year 2011) could be the industry effect. Canadian 
Accounting Standards Board (ACSB) allowed mining and investment firms to defer 
adopting IFRS. As a result, the positive association between CFO compensation in 
Canadian adopting_ firms and the year of IFRS _adoption (year 2011) could be attributed 
to the fact that other industries were arguably doing better in 2011 than mining and 
investment industries, and therefore CF Os of IFRS-adopting firms were compensated 
more than CF Os of non-adopting firms due to differences in industry performance. If this 
industry effect does exist, I should find a positive association between CFO 
compensation and year 2011 by testing a subsample of U.S. firms which have same first 
two-digits SIC. I use model 3 to test this subsample, and find that the coefficient for year 
2011 is not statistically significant (untabulated). I also compare my sample of adopting 
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firms with the sample of non-adopting U.S. firms using the Chow-test, and I get a 
p-value of< 0.001 (untabulated). The Chow-test rejects the hypothesis that all of 
coefficients from the two samples are the same. Therefore, the industry effect is not 
supported by my data. 
4.6 Alternative explanation for relative CFO compensation levels 
An alternative explanation for the positive association between CFO bonus relative 
to CEO bonus and IFRS adoption is the year effect. The relatively higher bonuses for 
CF Os could be due to excessive demand for or reduced supply of CF Os in 2011, 
requiring firms to pay more to retain or attract CFOs. To test whether this alternative 
explanation is correct, I conduct two univariate regression tests of model 4 by comparing 
Canadian firms that did not adopt IFRS in 2011 and U.S. firms respectively. Tenure is not 
included in these regressions because the data on U.S. based CFO tenure is not publicly 
available. The regression results are presented in panel B of table 3.8. The coefficients for 
( 1) Canadian non-adopters, and (2) for US firms are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that there is no significant change in relative bonus compensation in the year 
2011 compared to year 2010. I also conduct a Cho~ test to compare my sample of IFRS 
adopting firms with non-adopting Canadian firms and compare my sample of IFRS 
adopting firms with U.S. firms using model 4. The p-value from the Chow-test is 0.037 
107 
(untabulated), suggesting that the coefficients from the two samples are significantly 
different at 5% level. The alternative explanation of year effect is therefore not supported 
by my data. 
All my sensitivity tests suggest that the effect I consider to be the IFRS effect is not 
the same as the year effect or the industry effect. 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the association between executive compensation and IFRS 
adoption. I find that accounting-based pay for performance sensitivity became stronger 
once IFRS was adopted. Executives earned $11.37 more for every $1,000 increase of 
accounting income under IFRS than under previous Canadian GAAP. Compensation 
committees seem to consider accounting numbers produced by IFRS to be more 
meaningful for writing compensation contracts. While narratives provided with the 
compensation disclosure do not specifically mention IFRS as the base for the CFOs' 
bonuses, the link is inferred from the compensation numbers disclosed during the year of 
IFRS adoption. 
I also find CFO compensation increased by approximately $108,000 in the year of 
IFRS adoption, while CEO compensation does not change significantly in the year of 
IFRS adoption. I also find CFO bonus relative to CEO bonus increased by more than 20% 
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in the year of IFRS adoption compared to previous year. The increases in CFO absolute 
and relative compensation are both statistically and economically significant. These 
results suggest that CFOs were rewarded for what were additional management 
responsibilities in the year of IFRS adoption. 
This study can be extended to other factors such as who gets compensated for tax 
planning in a firm. Such studies contribute to finding other determinants of managerial 
compensation. 
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Table 3.1: Sample selection 
Panel A 
CFO 
Initial Sample (firm-years) from TSX 400 firms 
800 
2010-11 
Deletions due to missing data for 
Firms not adopting IFRS in 2011 -72 
Exclude total compensation of zero -3 
Executive compensation in Sedar -46 
Tenure in Sedar -2 
Volatility in Compustat -105 
Stock Return in Compustat -13 
EPS in Compustat -8 
Final Sample used in this study 551 1 
Panel B 
Initial Sample (firm-years) from TSX 400 firms 2010-11 
Deletions due to missing data for 
Firms not adopting IFRS in 2011 
Executive compensation in Sedar 
Observations with CEO total compensation of zero but 
CFO total compensation not zero 
Tenure in Sedar 
Final Sample used in this study 
1 
sample size in table 3.3 
2 sample size in table 3 .4 
3 sample size in table 3.5 
110 
# firm-years 
CEO 
800 
-72 
-8 
-42 
-5 
-105 
-13 
-8 
5472 
# firm-years 
800 
-72 
-46 
-10 
-1 
671 3 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Panel A: Dependent Variables (Cdn $amounts in thousands) 
Variables N Mean Median Std Min Max Dev 
CFO comgensation gre-IFRS adogtion 
Salary 267 261 255 130 - 693 
Bonus 267 158 110 173 - 1,017 
Cash Compensation 267 419 378 271 - 1,462 
Equity Compensation 267 424 187 622 - 5,533 
Total Compensation 267 925 685 785 67 5,976 
CFO comgensation in the year of IFRS adogtion 
Salary 284 280 272 138 - 900 
Bonus 284 173 103 210 - 1,800 
Cash Compensation 284 453 365 319 - 2,700 
Equity Compensation 284 405 222 574 - 5,075 
Total Compensation 284 958 705 812 37 5,593 
CEO comnensation gre-IFRS adogtion 
Salary 266 486 427 297 - 1,300 
Bonus 266 479 267 582 - 2,385 
Cash Compensation 266 985 692 858 - 3,686 
Equity Compensation 266 1,005 449 1,374 - 5,551 
Total Compensation 266 2,325 1,474 2,316 62 9,783 
CEO comnensation in the year of IFRS adogtion 
Salary 281 502 445 293 - 1,300 
Bonus 281 450 243 568 - 2,385 
Cash Compensation 281 968 692 814 - 3,686 
Equity Compensation 281 953 500 1,244 - 5,551 
Total Compensation 281 2,213 1,425 2,108 45 9,783 
Panel B: Continuous Variables 
Variable N Mean Median Std Min Max Dev 
CEO Tenure 547 7.476 5.000 7.122 1.000 41.530 
CFO Tenure 551 4.867 4.000 3.705 1.000 18.810 
Earnings per share (EPS) 551 0.912 0.330 1.610 -2.314 7.876 
One-Year Stock Return 551 3.42% 0.83% 7.23% -0.74% 44.47% 
Firm Size 551 6.724 6.448 1.485 0.001 10.448 
Book to Market Ratio 551 0.640 0.552 0.440 0.000 2.702 
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Volatility of Return 551 19.424 10.061 49.618 0.213 264.577 
Panel C: Discrete variables 
Variable coded N Percent coded N Percent 
Relative Tenure 1 161 22% 0 558 78% 
Variable definitions 
Compensation/dependent variables: Salary, Bonus (or non-equity 
compensation-annual), option awards, stock awards, and total compensation data are 
collected from Management Information Circulars, which are retrieved from Sedar37• 
Total Cash Compensation is the aggregate of salary and bonus. Total Equity 
Compensation is the sum of option award and stock awards. Variables are winsorized 
at the 1 % level at the top. 
Independent variables: Firm size is the natural log of market value plus one. Market 
Value is retrieved from Compustat. Stock Return is the sum of difference between 
end-of-year stock price and beginning-of-year stock price and dividend this year, all 
divided by beginning-of-year stock price. Earnings per share (EPS) is basic EPS 
retrieved from Compustat. Book-to-market ratio is book value of common equity 
divided by market value of common equity at end of year. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of annual stock return for the past five years. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 % level at both top and bottom. 
Discrete variables: Relative_ Tenure equals 1 if the tenure of CFO is longer than CEO 
in the same firm for this year, and 0 otherwise. 
37 www.sedar.com 
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Table 3.3: Test whether the association between compensation and accounting-based 
pay for performance sensitivity is stronger after IFRS adoption 
d Compensation =Po+P1 Year of IFRS Adoption + P2 Year of IFRS _Adoption * (dEPS) 
* +p3t:,.EPS + p4 CFO_ Indicator +Ps ~(Stock Return) + P6~Size + P1 !:,.Firm Return 
Volatility +p8 !:,.Book to Market 
Pred Model a Modelb 
Intercept 334.247*** 335.689··· 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Year ofIFRS_Adoption * (dEPS) (Hl)+ 210.110··· 211.127*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Year of IFRS Adoption + -204.070** -206.509** 
(0.022) (0.022) 
~EPS + -36.588 -36.615 
(0.455) (0.455) 
CFO Indicator 
- -92.497 -92.538 
-
(0.222) (0.222) 
!:,.(Stock Return) + 6.627 8.051 
(0.482) (0.515) 
Year ofIFRS_Adoption *(!:,.(Stock Return)) -3.292 
(0.859) 
!:,.Size + 44.729. 44.850. 
(0.067) (0.067) 
d(Firm Return Volatility) + 2.258 2.115 
(0.679) (0.702) 
!:,.(Book to Market) - -396.212*** -396.389*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
No. of observations 1068 1068 
R Square 0.058 0.058 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of the hypothesis 1 using a pooled OLS 
estimation. There are 1,068 firm-year observations over the period 2010 - 2011. 
The dependent measures and independent variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
P-Values are presented in parentheses. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level using a two-tailed test 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two-tailed test 
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Table 3.4: Test whether the accounting-based pay is higher after IFRS adoption 
A(Total compensation)/ A(Net Income) = Po+ P1 Year of IFRS _Adoption +p2 
CFO indicator 
Notes: 
Intercept 
Year of IFRS _Adoption 
CFO indicator 
No. of observations 
R-Squared 
Pred 
(H2)+ 
? 
CEO&CFO samples 
-7.325 
(0.217) 
11.372. 
(0.096) 
0.037 
(0.996) 
1219 
0.0023 
This table presents regression results of the hypothesis 2 using a pooled OLS 
estimation. There are 1,219 firm-year observations over the period 2010 - 2011. 
The dependent measures and independent variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
P-Values are presented in parentheses. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level using a two-tailed test 
* * Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two-tailed test 
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Table 3.5: Test of association between the CFO compensation and IFRS adoption 
CFO Compensation = Po+ P1 Year of IFRS adoption + P2 CFO_ Tenure + p3 EPS + P4 
Stock Return + Ps Firm Size + P6 Firm Return Volatility + p7 Book to Market + p 
Industry Indicators 
Pred Salary Bonus Cash Comp Equity Total Comp Comp 
Intercept -54,361 *** -56,015** -110,376*** -65,565 -219,451 * 
(0.001) (0.042) (0.006) (0.482) (0.051) 
Year ofIFRS (H3a) 26.994··· 27.757** 54.751 ••• 32.262 108.624* 
adoption + 
(0.003) (0.042) (0.006) (0.486) (0.052) 
CFO Tenure + 5.737*** -0.713 5.025 -2.359 6.716 
(0.000) (0.724) (0.085) (0.731) (0.416) 
EPS + -0.729 14.408 .. 13.678* -32.900 4.256 
(0.845) (0.011) (0.092) (0.101) (0.853) 
Stock Return + 1.488 -0.146 1.341 -1.739 3.199 
(0.142) (0.923) (0.542) (0.736) (0.607) 
Firm Size 42.197*** 46.542··· 88.739*** 181.016 280.854 ... + ••• 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Return 
-0.019 0.144 0.125 0.294 0.443 + 
Volatility 
(0.868) (0.401) (0.614) (0.613) (0.528) 
Book to 25.097** -12.857 12.240 -71.649 -56.057 -Market 
(0.032) (0.463) (0.629) (0.249) (0.434) 
Industries Included Included Included 
Include 
Included d 
No.of 551 551 551 551 551 
observations 
R-Squared 0.483 0.375 0.449 0.249 0.389 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of the hypothesis 3a using a pooled OLS 
estimation. There are 551 firm-year observations over the period 2010 - 2011. The 
dependent measures and independent variables are defined in Table 3.2. P-Values are 
presented in parentheses. 
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*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level using a two-tailed test 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two-tailed test 
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Table 3.6: Test of association between the CEO compensation and IFRS adoption 
CEO Compensation = Po+ P1 Year of IFRS adoption + P2 CEO_ Tenure + P3 EPS + P4 
Stock Return+ Ps Firm Size+ P6 Firm Return Volatility+ p7 Book to Market+ p 
Industry Indicators 
Pred Salary Bonus Cash Equity Total 
Comp Comp Comp 
Intercept -48,984 26,399 -29,077 -73,188 -5,611 
(0.187) (0.726) (0.773) (0.710) (0.985) 
Year ofIFRS (H3 
24.255 -13.371 14.112 35.478 1.216 
adoption b)+ 
(0.189) (0.721) (0.778) (0.717) (0.993) 
CEO Tenure + 5.768*** 4.267 9.178** 2.868 20.204* 
(0.000) (0.159) (0.024) (0.717) (0.094) 
EPS + 19.824** 72.887*** 94.137*** -13.774 145.425** 
(0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.740) (0.022) 
Stock Return + 6.337*** 4.635 16.588*** -6.539 24.647 
(0.002) (0.263) (0.003) (0.545) (0.135) 
Firm Size + 85.358*** 107.181 *** 193.493*** 446.585*** 735.621*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Return 
-0.453* -0.019 -0.789 -0.045 -1.668 + 
Volatility 
(0.052) (0.967) (0.212) (0.971) (0.375) 
Book to 66.600*** 31.393 99.058 -76.061 172.385 -Market 
(0.005) (0.517) (0.126) (0.547) (0.371) 
Industries Included Included Included Included Included 
No.of 
547 547 547 547 547 
observations 
R-Squared 0.511 0.470 0.551 0.303 0.433 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of the hypothesis 3b using a pooled OLS 
estimation. There are 54 7 firm-year observations over the period 2010 - 2011. The 
dependent measures and independent variables are defined in Table 3.2. P-Values are 
presented in parentheses. 
* * * Statistically significant at the 1 % level using a two-tailed test 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two-tailed test 
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Table 3.7: Test of CFO compensation relative to CEO compensation and IFRS 
Adoption 
Log of (CFO Compensation/CEO Compensation)= Po+P1Year2011 + P2 
Relative Tenure 
Pred Salary Bonus Cash Comp Equity Comp Total Comp 
Intercept -0.638 ... -1.146 ... -0.806··· -0.84i*** -0.114*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year (H4)+ 0.049 0.218·· 0.082 -0.030 0.063 
2011 
(0.272) (0.046) (0.141) (0.784) (0.225) 
Relative ? 0.235 ... 0.161 0.233*** -0.216* -0.047 
Tenure 
(0.000) (0.219) (0.000) (0.095) (0.448) 
No of 
observati 660 632 661 634 671 
on 
R-Squar 0.032 0.009 0.022 0.005 0.003 
ed 
Notes: 
This table presents regression results of the hypothesis 4 using a pooled OLS 
estimation. There are 671 firm-year observations over the period 2010 - 2011. The 
dependent measures and independent variables are defined in Table 3.2. P-Values are 
presented in parentheses. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 % level using a two-tailed test 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level using a two-tailed test 
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Table 3.8: Sensitivity Tests 
Non-adopters in U.S. firms 
Panel A Predicted by available on Canada 
alternative ExecuComp 
Absolute CFO Total explanation Coef. Coef. Compensation 
t-stat t-stat 
Year 2011 + 170.22 -0.028 -13.72 0.6068 
(0.292) (0.919) 
Firm Controls Included Included 
Industry Controls Included Included 
No. of observations 31 1788 
R-Squared 0.933 0.431 
Notes: 
Panel A presents regression results of the model 3 using different samples. 
CFO_ Tenure is dropped from model 3 because the tenure data of U.S. CF Os are not 
available. Year 2011 is a dummy variable which takes value of 1 when the observation 
is from 2011, and 0 when the observation is from 2010. P-Values are presented in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % 
levels, respectively. The results oft-test are reported in column T-stat. 
Predicted by Non-adopters in 
U.S. firms 
Panel B available on 
alternative Canada ExecuComp 
explanation 
CFO relative Bonus Coef. Coef. 
Year 2011 + 0.015 -0.037 
(0.97) (0.265) 
No. of observations 38 1981 
R-Squared 0.0001 0.0006 
Notes: 
Panel B presents regression results of the model 4 using different samples. 
Relative_Tenure is dropped from model 4 because the tenure data of U.S. CFOs are not 
available. Year 2011 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when the 
observation is from 2011, and 0 when the observation is from 2010. P-Values are 
presented in parentheses. *, * *, and * * * indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1 % levels, respectively. The results oft-test are reported in column T-stat. 
119 
References 
Aggarawal R., and A. Sam wick. 1999. The other side of the trade-off the impact of risk 
on executive compensation. Journal of Political Economy 107: 65-105. 
Aggarwal, R., I. Erel, R. M.Stulz, and R. Williamson. 2007. Do US firms have the best 
corporate governance? A cross-country examination of the relation between corporate 
governance and shareholder wealth. Working paper. 
Alexander, R.M., M. Ettredge, M.S. Stone, and L. Sun. 2008. Assessing Uncertain Tax 
Benefit Aggressiveness. Working paper. 
Amoako-Adu, B. and B. Smith. 2001. Dual Class Firms: Capitalization Ownership 
Structure and Recapitalization Back Into Single Class. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
25 (6): 1083-1111. 
Armstrong, C. S., J. L. Blouin, and D. F. Larcker. 2012. The incentives for tax 
planning. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (1 ): 391-411. 
Armstrong, C. S., M. E. Barth, A. D. Jagolinzer, and E. J. Riedl. 2010. Market Reaction 
to the Adoption of IFRS in Europe. The Accounting Review 85 (1 ): 31-61. 
Avallone F ., A. Quagli, and P. Ramassa. 2011. Stock Option Plans in Italy: 
Accounting Treatment, Financial Crisis, and Other Determinants. Working paper. 
Badertscher, B., J. Phillips, M. Pincus, and S. Rego. 2009. Earnings management 
strategies: To conform or not to conform? The Accounting Review 84 (2): 63-98. 
Bae, K. H., H. Tan, and M. Welker. 2008. International GAAP Differences: The Impact 
on Foreign Analysts. The Accounting Review 83 (3):593-628. 
Baker, G.B., and B.J. Hall. 2004. CEO incentive and Firm Size. Journal of Labor 
Economics 22 (4): 767-798. 
Balsam, S., E. A., Gordon, X. Li, and E. Runessen. 2012. Are CFOs Paid Higher After 
Mandatory Adoption ofIFRS? Working paper. 
Balsam, S., A. Irani, and J. Yin. Forthcoming. Impact of Job Complexity and 
120 
Performance on CFO Compensation. Accounting Horizons. 
Barth, M. E., W. R. Landsman, and M. H. Lang. 2008. International Accounting 
Standards and Accounting Quality. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (3):467-498. 
Beatty, A., and D. G. Harris. 1999. The effects of taxes, agency costs and information 
asymmetry on earnings management: A comparison of public and private firms. Review 
of Accounting Studies 4 (3): 299-326. 
Bebchuk, L., J. Fried, and D. Walker. 2002. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation. University of Chicago Law Review 69:751-846. 
Bedard, J.C., D. Falsetta, G. Krishnamoorthy, and T. C. Omer. 2010. Voluntary 
disclosure of auditor-provided tax services. Journal of the American Taxation 
Association 3 2 ( 1): 5 9-77. 
Ben-Amar, W., and P. Andre. 2006. Separation of ownership from control and acquiring. 
firm performance: The case of family ownership in Canada. Journal of Business Finance 
& Accounting 33 (3-4): 517-543. 
Blanchette, M., F. Racicot, and J. Girard. 2012. The Effects ofIFRS on Financial Ratios: 
Early Evidence in Canada. Working Paper. 
Bozec, Y., and C. Laurin. 2008. Large shareholder entrenchment and performance: 
Empirical evidence from Canada. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 35 (1-2): 
25-49. 
Chen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin. 2010. Are family firms more tax aggressive 
than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95 (1 ): 41-61. 
Cloyd, C. B., J. Pratt, and T. Stock. 1996. The use of financial accounting choice to 
support aggressive tax positions: Public and private firms. Journal of Accounting 
Research 34 (1 ): 23-43. 
Cook, K. A., G. R. Huston, and T. C. Omer. 2008. Earnings Management through 
Effective Tax Rates: The Effects of Tax-Planning Investment and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of2002. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (2): 447-471. 
Core, J.E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief 
121 
executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics 51: 371-406. 
Coughlan A., and R. Schmidt. 1985. Executive compensation, management turnover, and 
firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 7: 43-66. 
Daske, H., L. Hail, C. Leuz, and R. Verdi. 2008. Mandatory IFRS Reporting around the 
World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences. Journal of Accounting 
Research 46 (5): 1085-1142. 
Desai, M.A. 2003. The divergence between book income and tax income. Tax Policy and 
the Economy 17: 169-208. 
Desai, M.A., and D. Dharmapala. 2006. Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered 
incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1 ): 145-179. 
Desai, M.A., and D. Dharmapala. 2008. Tax and corporate governance: an economic 
approach. Tax and corporate governance 3: 13-30. 
Dhaliwal, D., R.Trezevant, and S. Wang. 1992. Taxes, investment-related tax shields and 
capital structure. Journal of the American Taxation Association 14 (1 ): 1-21. 
Ding, Y., H. Zhang, and J. Zhang. 2007. Private vs state ownership and earnings 
management: evidence from Chinese listed companies. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 15 (2): 223-238. 
Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2008. Long-run corporate tax 
avoidance. The Accounting Review 83 (1 ): 61-82. 
Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 20 I 0. The effects of executives on 
corporate tax avoidance. The Accounting Review 85 ( 4): 1163-1189. 
Edwards, A., C. Schwab, and T. Shevlin.2012. Financial Constraints and the Incentive for 
Tax Planning. Working paper. 
Erickson, M., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew. 2004. How much will firms pay for 
earnings that do not exist? Evidence of taxes paid on allegedly fraudulent earnings. The 
Accounting Review 79 (2): 387-408. 
122 
Feng, M., W. Ge, S. Luo, and T. Shevlin. 2011. Why do CFOs become involved in 
material accounting manipulations? Journal of Accounting and Economics 51 
(1-2):21-36. 
Frank, M. M., L. J. Lynch, and S. 0. Rego. 2009. Tax reporting aggressiveness and its 
relation to aggressive financial reporting. The Accounting Review 84 (2): 467-496. 
Gompers, P.A., Joy I., and A. Metrick. 2010. Extreme governance: An analysis of 
dual-class firms in the United States. Review of Financial Studies 23(3): 1051-108 
Guedhami, 0., and J. Pittman. 2008. The importance of IRS monitoring to debt pricing in 
private firms. Journal of Financial Economics 90 (1 ): 38-58. 
Guenther, D. A., E. L. Maydew, and S. E. Nutter. 1997. Financial reporting, tax costs, and 
book-tax conformity. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23 (3): 225-248. 
Gupta, S., and Newberry, K., 1997. Determinants of the variability in corporate effective 
tax rates: evidence from longitudinal data. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 16 
(1): 1-34. 
Hall, B.J ., and J.B. Liebman. 1998. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics CXIII (3): 653-691. 
Hanlon, M., and S. Heitzman. 2010. A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 50 (2):127-178. 
Hanlon, M., G. V. Krishnan, and L. F. Mills. 2012. Audit fees and book-tax 
differences. Journal of the American Taxation Association 34 (1): 55-86. 
Hanlon, M., S. K. Laplante, and T. Shevlin. 2005. Evidence on the possible information 
loss of conforming book income and taxable income. Working paper. 
Hanlon, M., and T. Shevlin. 2005. Book-tax conformity for corporate income: An 
introduction to the issues. Tax Policy and the Economy 19: 101-134. 
Harford, J., and K. Li. 2007. Decoupling CEO wealth and Firm Performance: The Case 
of Acquiring CEOs. The Journal of Finance LXII (2): 917-949. 
123 
Hartzell, J., and L. Starks. 2003. Institutional investors and executive compensation. 
Journal of Finance 58: 2351-2374. 
Hoitash, R., U .Hoitash, and K.M. Johnstone. 2012. Internal Control Material Weaknesses 
and CFO Compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research 29 (3): 768-803. 
Jensen, M., and K. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and_ top management incentives. 
Journal of Political Economy 98: 225-263. 
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360. 
Jiang, J., K. R. Petroni, and I. Y. Wang. 2010. CFOs and CEOs: Who have the most 
influence on earnings management? Journal of Financial Economics 96:513-526. 
Jimenez-Angueira, C. E.2007. Tax Environment Changes, Corporate Governance, and 
Tax Aggressiveness. Working paper. 
Key, K. G. 1997. Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable 
television industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23 (3): 309-337. 
Kim, J. B., and C. H. Yi. 2006. Ownership structure, business group affiliation, listing 
status, and earnings management: Evidence from Korea. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 23 (2): 427-464. 
Klassen, K. J. 1997. The impact of inside ownership concentration on the trade-off 
between financial and tax reporting. Accounting Review 72 (3): 455-474. 
Klassen, K. J., and A. Mawani. 2000. The Impact of Financial and Tax Reporting 
Incentives on Option Grants to Canadian CEOs. Contemporary Accounting Research 17 
(2): 227-262. 
Klein, P., D. Shapiro, and J.Young. 2005. Corporate governance, family ownership and 
firm value: the Canadian evidence. Corporate Governance: An International Review 13 
(6): 769-784. 
Lennox, C., P. Lisowsky, and J. Pittman. 2013. Tax aggressiveness and accounting 
fraud. Journal of Accounting Research: forthcoming. 
124 
Leuz, C., D. Nanda, and P. D. Wysocki. 2003. Earnings management and investor 
protection: an international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69 (3): 
505-527. 
Loyeung A., Z. Matolcsy, and P. Wells. 2011. IFRS errors, CF Os' accounting talent, 
compensation and turnover. Working Paper. 
Mawani, A. 2003. Cancellation of Executive Stock Options: Tax and Accounting Income 
Considerations. Contemporary Accounting Research 20 (3): 495-517. 
Maydew, E. L. 2001. Empirical tax research in accounting: A discussion. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 31 (1): 389-403. 
McGuire, S., D. Wang, and R. Wilson. 2011. Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance. 
Working paper. 
Mehran H. 1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics 38 (2): 163-184. 
Mills, L. F. 1996. Corporate tax compliance and financial reporting. National Tax 
Journal 49: 421-436. 
Mills, L. F. 1998. Book-tax differences and Internal Revenue Service 
adjustments. Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2): 343-356. 
Mills, L., M. Erickson, and E. Maydew. 1998. Investments in tax planning. Journal of the 
American Taxation Association 20 (1 ): 1-20. 
Mills, L. F., and K. J. Newberry. 2001. The influence of tax and nontax costs on book-tax 
reporting differences: Public and private firms. Journal of the American Taxation 
Association 23 (1): 1-19. 
Mills, L., M. Erickson, and E. Maydew. 1998. Investments in tax planning. Journal of the 
American Taxation Association 20(1): 1-20. 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market 
valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315. 
Morck, R., D. Strangeland, and B. Yeung, 2000, Inherited wealth, corporate control, and 
125 
economic growth, in Randall Morck, eds.: Concentrated Corporate Ownership 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 
Omer, T. C., J.C. Bedard, and D. Falsetta. 2006. Auditor-provided tax services: The 
effects of a changing regulatory environment. The Accounting Review 81 ( 5): l 095-1117. 
Ozkan, N., Z. Singer, and H. You. 2012. Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual 
Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation. Journal of 
Accounting Research 50 (4): 1077-1107. 
Rego, S., and R. Wilson. 2009. Executive compensation, tax reporting aggressiveness, 
and future firm performance. Working paper. 
Scholes, M., M. Wolfson, M. Erickson, E. Maydew, and T. Shevlin. 2005. Taxes and 
Business Strategy: A Planning Approach. Third Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Schuetze, H. J. 2000. Taxes, economic conditions and recent trends in male 
self-employment: a Canada-US comparison. Labour Economics 7 (5): 507-544. 
Scott W. 2006. Financial Accounting Theory. Toronto: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Shackelford, D. A., and T. Shevlin. 2001. Empirical tax research in accounting. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 31 (1): 321-387. 
Shevlin, T. 2002. Commentary on Corporate Tax Shelters and Book-Tax Differences. 
Tax Law Review 55: 427-443. 
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. The 
Journal of Political Economy 94 (3): 461-488. 
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of 
Finance 52 (2): 737-783. 
Smith, E. 1995. Is CFO compensation influenced by organizational size and ownership? 
Healthcare Financial Management 49 (10): 40-48. 
Smith, B. F., and B. Amoako-Adu. 1999. Management succession and financial 
performance of family controlled firms. Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (4): 341-368. 
126 
Steijvers, T., and M. Niskanen. 2011. Tax Aggressive Behaviour in Private Family 
Firms-the effect of the CEO and board of directors. Working paper. 
Thorne, L., D. W. Massey, and M. Magnan. 2003. Institutional context and auditors' 
moral reasoning: A Canada-US comparison. Journal of Business Ethics 43 ( 4): 305-321. 
Thuan, V., and L. Xu. 2011. The Impact of Dual Class Structure on Earnings 
Management Activities. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 37 (3-4): 456-485. 
Wolfson, M. 1993. The effect of ownership and control on taxes and financial reporting 
policy. Economic Notes 22 (2): 318-332. 
Wu, J. S., and I. X. Zhang. 2011. Accounting Integration and Comparability: Evidence 
from Relative Performance Evaluation around IFRS Adoption. Working Paper. 
Xie, B., W. N. Davidson, and P. J. DaDalt. 2003. Earnings management and corporate 
governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of corporate 
finance 9 (3): 295-316. 
Yin, G. 2003. How much tax do large public corporations pay?: Estimating the effective 
tax rates of the S&P 500. Virginia Law Review 89 (8): 1793-1856. 
Yip, R. W., and D. Young. 2012. Does mandatory IFRS adoption improve information 
comparability? The Accounting Review 87 (5): 1767-1789. 
Zeghal, D., S. M. Chtourou, and Y. M. Fourati. 2012. The Effect of Mandatory Adoption 
of IFRS on Earnings Quality: Evidence from the European Union. Journal of 
International Accounting Research 11 (2): 1-25. 
Zhao, Y., and K. H. Chen. 2008. Staggered boards and earnings management. The 
Accounting Review 83 (5): 1347-1381. 
Zhou, X. 1999. Executive compensation and managerial incentives: a comparison 
between Canada and the United States. Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (3): 277-301. 
Zimmerman, J. L.1983. Taxes and firm size. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5: 
119-149. 
127 
